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你可能喜欢木兰辞的英译版本
木兰辞的英译版本——欣赏
Tsiek tsiek and again tsiek tsiek,
Mu-lan weaves, facing the door.
You don't hear the shuttle's sound,
You only hear Daughter's sighs.
They ask Daughter who's in her heart,
They ask Daughter who's on her mind.
"No one is on Daughter's heart,
No one is on Daughter's mind.
Last night I saw the draft posters,
The Khan is calling many troops,
The army list is in twelve scrolls,
On every scroll there's Father's name.
Father has no grown-up son,
Mu-lan has no elder brother.
I want to buy a saddle and horse,
And serve in the army in Father's place."
In the East Market she buys a spirited horse,
In the West Market she buys a saddle,
In the South Market she buys a bridle,
In the North Market she buys a long whip.
At dawn she takes leave of Father and Mother,
In the evening camps on the Yellow River's bank.
She doesn't hear the sound of Father and Mother calling,
She only hears the Yellow River's flowing water cry tsien
At dawn she takes leave of the Yellow River,
In the evening she arrives at Black Mountain.
She doesn't hear the sound of Father and Mother calling,
She only hears Mount Yen's nomad horses cry tsiu tsiu.
She goes ten thousand miles on the business of war,
She crosses passes and mountains like flying.
Northern gusts carry the rattle of army pots,
Chilly light shines on iron armor.
Generals die in a hundred battles,
Stout soldiers return after ten years.
On her return she sees the Son of Heaven,
The Son of Heaven sits in the Splendid Hall.
He gives out promotions in twelve ranks
And prizes of a hundred thousand and more.
The Khan asks her what she desires.
"Mu-lan has no use for a minister's post.
I wish to ride a swift mount
To take me back to my home."
When Father and Mother hear Daughter is coming
They go outside the wall to meet her, leaning on each other.
When Elder Sister hears Younger Sister is coming
She fixes her rouge, facing the door.
When Little Brother hears Elder Sister is coming
He whets the knife, quick quick, for pig and sheep.
"I open the door to my east chamber,
I sit on my couch in the west room,
I take off my wartime gown
And put on my old-time clothes."
Facing the window she fixes her cloudlike hair,
Hanging up a mirror she dabs on yellow flower powder
She goes out the door and sees her comrades.
Her comrades are all amazed and perplexed.
Traveling together for twelve years
They didn't know Mu-lan was a girl.
"The he-hare's feet go hop and skip,
The she-hare's eyes are muddled and fuddled.
Two hares running side by side close to the ground,
How can they tell if I am he or she?"
From:The Flowering Plum and the Palac
本文来自: 疯狂英语([url]www.crazyenglish.org[/url]) 详细出处参考：
Mulan, the Maiden Chief
Say, Maiden at your spining wheel,
Why heave that deep-drawn sigh?
Is’t fare, perchance, or love you feel?
Pray tell --- oh, tell me why!
Nor fear nor love has moved my soul ---
Away such idle thought！
A warrior’s glory is goal!
By my ambition sought
My father’s cherished life to save,
My country to redeem,
The chargers of the field I’ll brave）,
I am not what I seem.
No son has he his troop to lead,
No brother dear have I;
So I must mount my father’s steed,
And to the battle hie.
At dawn of day she quits her door,
At evening rests her head,
When loud the mountain torrents roar,
And mail-clad soldiers tread.
The northern plains are gained at last,
The mountains sink from view,
The sun shines cold, and the wintryblast,
It pierce through and through.
A thousand foes around her fall,
And the blood stains the ground.
But Mulan, who survives at all,
Returns with glory crowned.
Before the throne they bend the knee,
In the palace of Changan.
Full many as knight of high degree,
But the braved is Mulan.
“Nay, Prince,” she cries, “my duty’s done, No
Guerdon I D
But let me to my home begone,
To cheer my aged Sire.”
She nears the door of her father’s home,
A chief with trumpet’
But when she doffs her waving plume,
She stands a maiden fair.
Johann&Hari:&How&to&survive&the&age&of&distraction
In the 20th century, all the nightmare-novels of the
future imagined that books would be burnt. In the 21st century, our
dystopias imagine a world where books are forgotten. To pluck just
one, Gary Steynghart's novel Super Sad True Love Story describes a
world where everybody is obsessed with their electronic Apparat &
an even more omnivorous i-Phone with a flickering stream of
shopping and reality shows and porn & and have somehow come to
believe that the few remaining unread paper books let off a rank
smell. The book on the book, it suggests, is
I have been thinking about this because I recently
moved flat, which for me meant boxing and heaving several Everests
of books, accumulated obsessively since I was a kid. Ask me to
throw away a book, and I begin shaking like Meryl Streep in
Sophie's Choice and insist that I just couldn't bear to part
company with it, no matter how unlikely it is I will ever read
(say) a 1,000-page biography of little-known Portuguese dictator
Antonio Salazar. As I stacked my books high, and watched my friends
get buried in landslides of novels or avalanches of polemics, it
struck me that this scene might be incomprehensible a generation
from now. Yes, a few specialists still haul their vinyl collections
from house to house, but the rest of us have migrated happily to
MP3s, and regard such people as slightly odd. Does it matter? What
was really lost?
The book & the physical paper book & is being circled
by a shoal of sharks, with sales down 9 per cent this year alone.
It's being chewed by the e-book. It's being gored by the death of
the bookshop and the library. And most importantly, the mental
space it occupied is being eroded by the thousand Weapons of Mass
Distraction that surround us all. It's hard to admit, but we all
sense it: it is becoming almost physically harder to read
In his gorgeous little book The Lost Art of Reading &
Why Books Matter in a Distracted Time, the critic David Ulin admits
to a strange feeling. All his life, he had taken reading as for
granted as eating & but then, a few years ago, he "became aware, in
an apartment full of books, that I could no longer find within
myself the quiet necessary to read". He would sit down to do it at
night, as he always had, and read a few paragraphs, then find his
mind was wandering, imploring him to check his email, or Twitter,
or Facebook. "What I'm struggling with," he writes, "is the
encroachment of the buzz, the sense that there's something out
there that merits my attention."
I think most of us have this sense today, if we are
honest. If you read a book with your laptop thrumming on the other
side of the room, it can be like trying to read in the middle of a
party, where everyone is shouting to each other. To read, you need
to slow down. You need mental silence except for the words. That's
getting harder to find.
No, don't misunderstand me. I adore the web, and they
will have to wrench my Twitter feed from my cold dead hands. This
isn't going to turn into an antedeluvian rant against the glories
of our wired world. But there's a reason why that word & "wired" &
means both "connected to the internet" and "high, frantic, unable
to concentrate".
In the age of the internet, physical paper books are
a technology we need more, not less. In the 1950s, the novelist
Herman Hesse wrote: "The more the need for entertainment and
mainstream education can be met by new inventions, the more the
book will recover its dignity and authority. We have not yet quite
reached the point where young competitors, such as radio, cinema,
etc, have taken over the functions from the book it can't afford to
We have now reached that point. And here's the
function that the book & the paper book that doesn't beep or flash
or link or let you watch a thousand videos all at once & does for
you that nothing else will. It gives you the capacity for deep,
linear concentration. As Ulin puts it: "Reading is an act of
resistance in a landscape of distraction.... It requires us to pace
ourselves. It returns us to a reckoning with time. In the midst of
a book, we have no choice but to be patient, to take each thing in
its moment, to let the narrative prevail. We regain the world by
withdrawing from it just a little, by stepping back from the
A book has a different relationship to time than a TV
show or a Facebook update. It says that something was worth taking
from the endless torrent of data and laying down on an object that
will still look the same a hundred years from now. The French
writer Jean-Phillipe De Tonnac says "the true function of books is
to safeguard the things that forgetfulness constantly threatens to
destroy." It's precisely because it is not immediate & because it
doesn't know what happened five minutes ago in Kazakhstan, or in
Charlie Sheen's apartment & that the book matters.
That's why we need books, and why I believe they will
survive. Because most humans have a desire to engage in deep
thought and deep concentration. Those muscles are necessary for
deep feeling and deep engagement. Most humans don't just want
m they also want meals.
I'm not against e-books in principle & I'm tempted
by the Kindle & but the more they become interactive and linked,
the more they multitask and offer a hundred different functions,
the less they will be able to preserve the aspects of the book that
we actually need. An e-book reader that does a lot will not, in the
end, be a book. The object needs to remain dull so the words &
offering you the most electric sensation of all: insight into
another person's internal life & can sing.
So how do we preserve the mental space for the book?
We are the first generation to ever use the internet, and when I
look at how we are reacting to it, I keep thinking of the Inuit
communities I met in the Arctic, who were given alcohol and sugar
for the first time a generation ago, and guzzled them so rapidly
they were now sunk in obesity and alcoholism. Sugar, alcohol and
the web are all amazing pleasures and joys & but we need to know
how to handle them without letting them addle us.
The idea of keeping yourself on a digital diet will,
I suspect, become mainstream soon. Just as I've learned not to
stock my fridge with tempting carbs, I've learned to limit my
exposure to the web & and to love it in the limited window I allow
myself. I have installed the programme "Freedom" on my laptop: it
will disconnect you from the web for however long you tell it to.
It's the Ritalin I need for my web-induced ADHD. I make sure I
activate it so I can dive into the more permanent world of the
printed page for at least two hours a day, or I find myself with a
sense of endless online connection that leaves you oddly
disconnected from yourself.
TS Eliot called books "the still point of the
turning world". He was right. It turns out, in the age of
super-speed broadband, we need dead trees to have fully living
The New Britannia
Big Government corrodes the integrity of a people,
catastrophically.
The trick in this business is not to be right too
early. A week ago I released my new book — the usual doom’n’gloom
stuff — and, just as the sensible prudent moderate chaps were about
to dismiss it as hysterical and alarmist, Standard
& Poor’s went and downgraded the United States from
its AAA rating for the first time in history. Obligingly enough
they downgraded it to AA+, which happens to be the initials of my
book: After America. Okay, there’s not a lot of “+” in that,
but you can’t have everything.
But the news cycle moves on, and a day or two later,
the news shows were filled with scenes of London ablaze, as gangs
of feral youths trashed and looted their own neighborhoods. Several
readers wrote to taunt me for not having anything to say on the
London riots. As it happens, Chapter Five of my book is called “The
New Britannia: The Depraved City.” You have to get up pretty early
in the morning to beat me to Western civilization’s descent into
barbarism. Anyone who’s read it will fully understand what’s
happening on the streets of London. The downgrade and the riots are
part of the same story: Big Government debauches not only a
nation’s finances but its human capital, too.
As part of my promotional efforts, I chanced to find
myself on a TV show the other day with an affable liberal who
argued that what Obama needed to do was pass another
trillion-dollar — or, better yet, multi-trillion — stimulus. I
think not. The London rioters are the children of dependency, the
progeny of Big Government: They have been marinated in “stimulus”
their entire lives. There is literally nothing you can’t get Her
Majesty’s Government to pay for. From page 205 of my book:
“A man of 21 with learning disabilities has been
granted taxpayers’ money to fly to Amsterdam and have sex with a
prostitute.”
Hey, why not? “He’s planning to do more than just have
his end away,” explained his social worker. “Refusing to offer him
this service would be a violation of his human rights.”
Why do they need a Dutch hooker? Just another
hardworking foreigner doing the jobs Britons won’t do? Given the
reputation of English womanhood, you’d have thought this would be
the one gig that wouldn’t have to be outsourced overseas.
While the British Treasury is busy writing checks to
Amsterdam prostitutes, one-fifth of children are raised in homes in
which no adult works — in which the weekday ritual of rising,
dressing, and leaving for gainful employment is entirely unknown.
One tenth of the adult population has done not a day’s work since
Tony Blair took office on May 1, 1997.
If you were born into such a household, you’ve been
comprehensively “stimulated” into the dead-eyed zombies staggering
about the streets this last week: pathetic inarticulate sub-humans
unable even to grunt the minimal monosyllables to BBC interviewers
desperate to appease their pathologies. C’mon, we’re not asking
much: just a word or two about how it’s all the fault of government
“cuts” like the leftie columnists argue. And yet even that is
beyond these baying beasts. The great-grandparents of these brutes
stood alone against a Fascist Europe in that dark year after the
fall of France in 1940. Their grandparents were raised in one of
the most peaceful and crime-free nations on the planet. Were those
Englishmen of the mid-20th century to be magically transplanted to
London today, they’d assume they were in some fantastical remote
galaxy. If Charlton Heston was horrified to discover the Planet of
the Apes was his own, Britons are beginning to realize that the
remote desert island of&Lord of
the Flies&is, in fact, located
just off the coast of Europe in the north-east Atlantic. Within two
generations of the Blitz and the Battle of Britain, a significant
proportion of the once-free British people entrusted themselves to
social rewiring by liberal compassionate Big Government and thereby
rendered themselves paralytic and unemployable save for
non-speaking parts in&Rise of the
Planet of the Apes. And even that would likely be too much like
hard work.
Here’s another line from my book:
“In Britain, everything is policed except crime.”
Her Majesty’s cowed and craven politically correct constabulary
stand around with their riot shields and Robocop gear as young
rioters lob concrete through store windows to steal the electronic
toys that provide their only non-narcotic or alcoholic amusement. I
chanced to be in Piccadilly for the springtime riots when the
police failed to stop the mob from smashing the windows of the Ritz
and other upscale emporia, so it goes without saying that they
wouldn’t lift a finger to protect less prestigious private property
from thugs. Some of whom are as young as nine years old. And
Yet a police force all but entirely useless when it comes to
preventing crime or maintaining public order has time to police
everything else. When Sam Brown observed en passant to a mounted
policeman on Cornmarket Street in Oxford, “Do you know your horse
is gay?”, he was surrounded within minutes by six officers and a
fleet of patrol cars, handcuffed, tossed in the slammer overnight,
and fined 80 pounds. Mr. Brown’s “homophobic comments,” explained a
spokesmoron for Thames Valley Police, were “not only offensive to
the policeman and his horse, but any members of the general public
in the area.” The zealous crackdown on Sam Brown’s hippohomophobia
has not been replicated in the present disturbances. Anyone who has
so much as glanced at British policing policy over the last two
decades would be hard pressed to argue which party on the streets
of London, the thugs or the cops, is more irredeemably stupid.
This is the logical dead end of the Nanny State. When William
Beveridge laid out his blueprint for the British welfare regime in
1942, his goal was the “abolition of want” to be accomplished by
“co-operation between the State and the individual.” In attempting
to insulate the citizenry from life’s vicissitudes, Sir William
succeeded beyond his wildest dreams. As I write in my book: “Want
has been all but abolished. Today, fewer and fewer Britons want to
work, want to marry, want to raise children, want to lead a life of
any purpose or dignity.” The United Kingdom has the highest drug
use in Europe, the highest incidence of sexually transmitted
disease, the highest number of single mothers, the highest abortion
rate. Marriage is all but defunct, except for William and Kate,
fellow toffs, upscale gays, and Muslims. From page 204:
“For Americans, the quickest way to understand modern Britain is to
look at what LBJ’s Great Society did to the black family and
imagine it applied to the general population”.
I believe it is regarded as a sign of insanity to start quoting
oneself, but at the risk of trying your patience I’ll try one more,
because it’s the link between America’s downgraded debt and
Britain’s downgraded citizenry:
“The evil of such a system is not the waste of money but the waste
of people.”
Big Government means small citizens: It corrodes the integrity of a
people, catastrophically. Within living memory, the city in flames
on our TV screens every night governed a fifth of the earth’s
surface and a quarter of its population. When you’re imperialists
on that scale, there are bound to be a few mishaps along the way.
But nothing the British Empire did to its subject peoples has been
as total and catastrophic as what a post-great Britain did to its
There are lessons for all of us there.
a&National
Review&columnist, is author
of&& 2011 Mark
美国《外交》杂志：中国到底在想什么？
What China
What China Wants
【美国《外交》双月刊7/8月号文章】题：中国到底想什么？
ANDREW J. NATHAN Professor of Political Science at Columbia
University
作者美国哥伦比亚大学政治学教授安德鲁·内森,观点多代表美国自由派,
Henry Kissinger's new book argues that the United States should
yield gracefully to China' Aaron Friedberg's gives the
opposite advice. By focusing on intentions instead of capabilities,
both books overstate China's actual power.
内容提要：亨利·基辛格新书主张美国应优雅大度地为中国的崛起让路；阿伦·弗里德伯格的新书则持相反观点。两本书将注意力集中在中国的意图而非能力上，均高估了中国的实际力量。
As a connoisseur of fine diplomacy, Henry Kissinger finds a lot of
it to admire in China. His new book, cast as a history of Chinese
foreign policy, traces the twists and turns of Chinese strategy
since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, quoting
liberally from his numerous conversations with Chinese leaders. But
On China is really neither history nor memoir. Its purpose is to
argue that the United States should yield gracefully to China's
rise in order to avoid a tragic conflict.
亨利·基辛格是外交大师，他对中国外交大加赞赏。有人说他的新书《论中国》是一部中国外交政策史，书中追溯自1949年建国以来中国战略的曲曲折折。不过，《论中国》实际上既不是历史，也不是回忆录。其目的是要阐明美国应当优雅地顺应中国的崛起，从而避免悲剧性冲突发生。
Aaron Friedberg gives the opposite advice. A Princeton professor
and former foreign policy adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, he
analyzes the strategies that China and the United States have used
in dealing with each other since the early 1990s and tries to
decipher China's intentions in the coming decades. In the face of
growing Chinese power and ambition, the United States, he argues,
must stand strong in those many areas in which China's interests
are adverse to its own. Together, the two books offer a window onto
the strategic split over China among mainstream
Republicans.
阿伦·弗里德伯格在《争夺霸权———中美东亚控制权之争》一书中的观点正相反。普林斯顿大学教授、前副总统切尼的外交政策顾问弗里德伯格对中美两国自上世纪90年代初以来所采取的外交策略进行了分析，试图窥测中国未来几十年的意图。他认为，面对中国越来越大的实力和野心，美国必须在很多中美利益相悖的方面强硬对待中国。这两本书可以让读者从中了解到共和党两大流派在对华问题上的战略分歧。
Kissinger likens Chinese diplomacy to the game of wei qi
(equivalent to the Japanese game of go), a patient contest of
encirclement in which victory is only relative. Chinese strategists
view the quest for a decisive outcome as illusory. Instead, they
play a game of "combative coexistence," seeking to improve their
relative power position amid the ever-changing forces of world
politics. At the necessary moment, one may deliver a salutary
psychological shock and then withdraw, as the Chinese did to the
Indians in 1962 to put a stop to incursions along their contested
border, and as they did to the Soviets in 1969 to deter Moscow from
probing Chinese positions along their frontier. On other occasions,
one may hide one's light and bide one's time, as Deng Xiaoping
famously advised his colleagues to do in 1991, telling them to
maintain good relations with the United States while building up
China's strength. Or it might be useful to claim hurt dignity and
designate a whole topic as nonnegotiable, as Beijing did in 1993-94
when U.S. President Bill Clinton tried to make favorable tariff
rates conditional on improvements on human rights, and as it is
doing today over territorial issues.
基辛格把中国外交比作下围棋———一种考验耐性的包围和反包围游戏。围棋的胜负只是相对的。中国的战略家认为追求绝对胜利是不切实际的。相反，他们玩的游戏是既对立又共存，寻求在不断变化的世界政治格局中提升自己的相对位置。在必要的时候敲山震虎，给对方一个令其清醒的打击，然后全身而退，就像中国在1962年对付印度那样，阻止了对方蚕食其边界。再如1969年向苏联亮剑，吓阻了苏联对中方哨卡的骚扰。在其他一些情况下，正如邓小平教导的那样，“韬光养晦”，意思是说中国在与美国保持良好关系的同时，加强中国自身的实力。他在1991年告诫手下要与美国保持良好关系，同时苦练内功。中国还可以大打义愤牌、将整个议题划在讨论范围之外，如北京在年对克林顿试图将优惠关税与人权记录挂钩的反应；再如现今中国对领土争议的处理。
Kissinger sees contrasts here with the usual approach of U.S.
diplomats, which often frustrated him when he was running the show.
Where American negotiators tend to compartmentalize issues and seek
solutions, their Chinese counterparts prefer to integrate issues
and seek understandings. Whereas Americans believe that agreements
can be reached in one sector while disagreements are expressed in
another, Chinese prefer to characterize the whole atmosphere as
warm or cold, friendly or tense, creating an incentive for the
other side to put disagreements on the back burner. Whereas
Americans are troubled by deadlocks, Chinese know how to leverage
them to keep pressure on the other side. American diplomacy is
Chinese diplomacy, psychological.
基辛格发现美国外交官的惯常做法往往与中国的不同，在他主政的时候这些外交官经常令他沮丧。美国外交家喜欢把问题孤立开来，然后寻求解决办法，中国外交家喜欢将问题融合起来，寻求达成谅解。美国人认为可在某个部分达成意见一致，而另一个部分可以表明分歧。中国人则喜欢把整个气氛定性为热烈或冷淡、友好或紧张，鼓励对方暂时搁置分歧。美国人陷入纠结时，中国人知道该怎样利用时机向对方施压。美国外交重交易，中国外交重心理。
Kissinger quotes the advice of the ancient military strategist
Sun-tzu, who argued that one can win a battle before it begins by
staking out a dominant political and psychological position. As far
back as the third century, the military commander Zhuge Liang
turned back an enemy army by opening the city gates and sunning
him this looked like a trap and frightened
away the opposing general. In 1793-94, the Qianlong emperor fended
off the British delegate Lord George Macartney with smothering
when Macartney failed to get the point, the court
dismissed him with a note left on a silk chair. In 1958, Mao Zedong
received the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev not just at his
private swimming pool but in it, forcing the Soviet leader to
negotiate in water wings. When Kissinger met Zhou Enlai for the
first time, in 1971, the premier had arranged his schedule to leave
only two negotiating slots, totaling 13 hours, available during
Kissinger's time in Beijing, forcing the American envoy to agree to
a presidential visit with few details resolved in
基辛格在书中引用了中国古代孙子兵法中的”不战而屈人之兵”。早在公元三世纪，孔明就以空城计吓退敌军。1793-94年间，乾隆帝以繁文缛节拒绝了大英使节乔治·马葛尔尼勋爵（Lord George Macartney
），的外交要求，使之无功而返&&&。1958年毛泽东对苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫的接待。当时毛泽东身着泳衣在中南海游泳池会见在旁等候的赫鲁晓夫，迫其穿着救生衣谈判。&1971年，基辛格首次会见周恩来时，按照周总理自己的时间安排，只有两个空档共13个小时可用来在基辛格访华期间与之谈判，这就迫使这位美国特使在未能事先就一些具体细节达成一致的情况下同意总统访华。
Such tactics make hospitality "an aspect of strategy," Kissinger
explains, leaving a foreign guest awed, discomfited, or wooed by
the host's wealth, generosity, and composure. Chinese diplomats are
adept at the use of friendship, which leaves "the other side . . .
flattered by being admitted to the Chinese 'club' as an 'old
friend,' a posture that makes disagreement more complicated and
confrontations painful," Kissinger writes. As the Manchu diplomat
Qiying said about dealing with the British "barbarians," it was
necessary to "curb them by sincerity."
基辛格说，这种策略使款待之道成为中国外交策略的一个方面，使得来访客人被东道主的奢华、热情、慷慨和沉着冷静所震慑。中国外交官善于利用友情，它使得对方因觉得自己被视为中国的“老朋友”而感到荣幸。而美国的外交是传教士式的，具干涉主义色彩，目光短浅，急功近利。
It helps to come from an ancient civilization. "The duration and
scale of the Chinese past allow Chinese leaders to use the mantle
of an almost limitless history to evoke a certain modesty in their
opposite numbers," Kissinger writes. His occasional digs at the
United States -- whose foreign policy culture he describes as
"missionary," interventionist, narrow-visioned, and crassly
pragmatic -- show how hard it was to represent a nation that lacks
that asset. At Kissinger and Zhou's first conversation, Zhou ceded
seniority to the United States by comparing the age of the American
republic (some 200 years) to that of the People's Republic (22
years). It was flattering, even though Kissinger knew it was
拥有悠久的文明是中国的优势。基辛格写到：中国历史博大精深，中国领袖引经据典，对手的谦恭之意油然而生。基辛格不时奚落美国，表明了代表一个缺乏历史的国家有多难。他将美国外交比作”传教士式”
：指手画脚、鼠目寸光、急功近利。在基辛格与周总理的首轮会谈中，周总理向美国的资历致敬，当时美国建国二百多年，共和国仅成立二十二年，基辛格深知这样的比较不正确，但也颇为受用。
The problem with Kissinger's book is not the facts. These are well
grounded in the scholarly literature and, throughout much of the
book, in the notes of conversations in which he himself took part.
But newer scholarship has long since called into doubt any
essentialism about China's "singularity," "centrality," or
"strategic patience." Although Kissinger does not use the word, the
picture he paints is of an eternal -- and very Oriental -- China.
And it is not clear why China's long history of diplomacy makes it
necessary for the United States to yield to Chinese preferences in
the present. What is lacking for such an argument is an analysis of
the material realities of China's relative power, which even after
20 years of spectacular economic growth remain in many ways
unfavorable.
基辛格新书的问题不在于其事实部分，毕竟书中文字严谨、许多对话乃作者亲身经历。但更新的学术研究早已质疑将中国的”独特性、中心性、战略隐忍”等无限拔高的论调。虽然基辛格没有用”永恒”一词，但其描述的就是一个永恒的、非常东方的中国。但基辛格在书中没有说明中国悠久的历史与美国必须让路之间的因果关系，其论点难以成立还在于他没有对中国的相对实力进行分析——尽管经历了20年的飞速发展，很多方面仍处于劣势。
CONTENTIOUS INTENTIONS
Friedberg also exaggerates Chinese power, although in pursuit of a
different argument. His is the most thoughtful and informative of a
stream of China-threat books that have come out since the
mid-1990s. Within that genre, its contribution is to focus on
China's strategic intentions. Although Friedberg agrees with the
classical realist logic that a change in power relations inevitably
generates rivalry, he also believes it is important to figure out
what, as he puts it, China wants.
尽管论点不同，弗里德伯格同样夸大了中国的实力。在九十年代中期以来涌现的”中国威胁论”丛书中，他的新书最为深思熟虑，内容最为详实。本书聚焦于中国的战略意图。弗里德伯格赞同经典现实主义关于”相对实力的变动必定引发对抗”的逻辑，但同时也相信推测中国意图的重要性。
His method is to synthesize the views of Chinese public
intellectuals who write in Chinese policy magazines roughly similar
in function to Foreign Affairs and in other media. The authors on
whom he draws are professors or fellows (and some graduate
students) at universities and think tanks and a few military
officers who work in jobs that allow them to write books and
articles for the general public. Friedberg argues that these
materials "reflect the main currents of 'responsible' opinion"
among Chinese writers, "some of [whom] are known to have access to
the inner circles of the party and state." What he reads these
experts as saying is that China should seek to "displace the United
States as the dominant player in East Asia, and perhaps to extrude
it from the region altogether."
弗里德伯格一书采用的方法为归纳总结在公开政治刊物上著文的中国学者的观点。这些学者包括大学教授和智库研究人员以及多名军方人士，其中不乏手眼通天的高人。弗里德伯格认为这些材料代表了中国学者”负责任的”主流观点，即：中国应谋求取代美国成为东亚的统治力量，甚至将美国排斥在本地区之外。
But this method of assessing Chinese intentions is full of
pitfalls. Authors who write for the Chinese public have to compete
for attention the same way that American public intellectuals do,
with edgy views and vivid writing. And they do not all agree with
one another. In fact, the authors Friedberg cites take varied
positions, ranging from that of Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, who
wants China to become "world number one," to that of the scholar
Wang Jisi, who emphasizes common interests between China and the
United States. The attempt to synthesize these views creates a
false unity, with Friedberg privileging those of the writers who
say the sharpest things. Moreover, as pointed out by Thomas
Christensen in these pages ("The Advantages of an Assertive China,"
March/April 2011), Chinese policymakers have consistently been more
cautious in practice than the Chinese media have been in their
rhetoric. The proper takeaway from Friedberg's analysis is that the
Chinese public has been treated to a rich diet of nationalist
sentimentality, which for whatever reason is permitted -- or
perhaps even mandated -- by the propaganda department, which
ultimately controls the Chinese media.
但是，弗里德伯格分析中国意图的方法有众多缺陷。一、美国公众学者一样，为公开刊物供稿的中国学者必须用激进的观点和露骨的文字来吸引读者。二、各个学者的观点也不尽相同，比如弗里德伯格引用的两人：军方刘某希望中国成为世界第一，而学者王某则强调中美共同利益。弗里德伯格融合不同观点的努力营造了一个”在思想上保持高度一致”的假像，而且他青睐言论最尖锐的学者。三、中国决策层比中国刊物的激昂文字要稳重得多。弗里德伯格的分析严格来讲只能得出如下结论：经真理部首肯，中国读者有福享用民族主义浓厚的精神大餐。
By focusing on intentions, Friedberg, like Kissinger, leaves out
any serious accounting of China's capability to achieve the goals
that various writers propose. Such an audit would show that China
is bogged down both internally and in Asia generally. At home, it
devotes enormous resources, including military ones, to maintaining
control over the two-fifths of its territory that comprise Xinjiang
and greater Tibet, to keeping civil order throughout the densely
populated and socially unstable Han heartland, and to deterring
Taiwan's independence. Around its borders, it is surrounded chiefly
by two kinds of countries: unstable ones where almost any
conceivable change will make life more difficult for Chinese
strategists (such as Myanmar, North Korea, and the weak states of
Central Asia) and strong ones that are likely to get stronger in
the future and compete with China (such as India, Japan, Russia,
and Vietnam). And everywhere on its periphery, on land and at sea,
China faces the powerful presence of the United States. The U.S.
Pacific Command remains the most muscular of the U.S. military's
six regional combatant commands, after the Central Command (which
is managing two ongoing wars), and it continues to adjust its
strategies as China's military modernizes.
与基辛格一样，弗里德伯格注重于中国的意图，并未对中国是否具备相应实力的问题进行深入探讨。这方面的探讨往往会得出以下结论：对内，中国要动用巨大资源维护社会稳定；对外，要面临两类国家的包围——一是不稳定国家如缅甸、朝鲜和中亚弱国，二是日益强大的竞争对手如印度、日本、俄国、越南等。此外，在中国周边，美国的威风无处不在。除中央司令部外，太平洋司令部是美军六大区域司令部中最强大的，而且还在不断调整其策略以应对中国的军事现代化。
Friedberg is also imprecise. His title, A Contest for Supremacy,
part of his subtitle, the Struggle for Mastery in
Asia, means another -- and neither idea is vindicated by the body
of the book. He is on firmer ground when he writes that "if China's
power continues to grow, and if it continues to be ruled by a
one-party authoritarian regime, its relations with the United
States are going to become increasingly tense and competitive." But
friction is not conflict.
弗里德伯格新书行文皆不够精确。书名《一场争夺霸权的较量》与副标题《争当亚洲老大》意味着两码事，并且均不能被书中内容支持。他的观点”如果中国实力不断增强，如果中国还是一党的领导，中美关系只能越来越紧张”还算靠谱。但是磨擦并不等同于冲突。
And all this assumes that China's rise will continue unabated.
Friedberg reasonably enough makes this assumption for the purposes
of argument. But it is unlikely to prove correct in the long run
because China's economic and political model faces so many
vulnerabilities. To add to the worries of Chinese leaders, as
Friedberg points out, there are U.S. intentions: "stripped of
diplomatic niceties, the ultimate aim of the American strategy is
to hasten a revolution, albeit a peaceful one, that will sweep away
China's one-party authoritarian state." This helps explain why
Chinese leaders act more like people under siege than like people
on an expansionist warpath.
弗里德伯格的观点建立在中国还能保持高速增长的前提上。从长远来看，这个前提不太可能成立，因为中国的政治、经济模式存在如此多的软肋。令中国领导人坐立不安的还有美国的意图，正如弗里德伯格所写：”剥掉温文尔雅的外交辞令，美国的终极目标只有一个，那就是推动革命，横扫TG的江山。”这也解释了为什么中国领导人有时行如困兽而非军事扩散狂人。
Even if China does stay on course, it cannot hope for anything that
can reasonably be called supremacy, or even regional mastery,
unless U.S. power radically declines. Absent that development, it
is implausible that, as Friedberg predicts, "the nations of Asia
will choose eventually to follow the lead of a rising China,
'bandwagoning' with it . . . rather than trying to balance against
it." Instead, the more China rises, the more most of China's
neighbors will want to balance with the United States, not against
即使中国能够保持高速发展，除非美国急剧下滑，不然所谓的霸权或区域老大皆是春秋大梦。因此，弗里德伯格关于”亚洲国家将对中国亦步亦趋”的预言也就相当无稽。相反的，中国越发展，亚洲众小越是会投入美国的怀抱。
REACTING TO RISE
Kissinger ends his book with a policy recommendation that is
disappointingly brief and imprecise. He urges the creation of a
Pacific Community, "to which the United States, China, and other
states all belong and in whose peaceful development all
participate." But why should the United States yield so much
authority to China? Every other potential member of this community
will also ask whether such a project would enhance or reduce its
power. The Chinese will wonder why they should bind themselves to
U.S. priorities in this way. Larger Asian powers, such as Japan and
South Korea, will doubt the benefit of submerging themselves in a
U.S.-Chinese condominium. And smaller states will see themselves at
risk of being sold out by their major ally, either China or the
United States. The proposal's premise, that a U.S.-Chinese
confrontation must be avoided, is sound, but it fails to take
national interests into account.
基辛格新书以一个政治建议作结，令人失望的是，该建议简短且不精确。基辛格力主建立一个环太平洋社区，”中美及其它相关国家共同参与该社区的和平发展”。但问题是美国为何要对中国作出这么多的让步？其它国家会考虑加入这样的组织对自己是否有利。中国会问他们为什么要受到美国的约束。大一点的亚洲国家如日韩等还会质疑淌中美混水的好处，而群小们则唯恐成为中美讨价还价的筹码。这个建议的前提不假，即中美冲突必须避免，但基辛格未能将各国利益考虑进去。
Friedberg rejects the idea of a two-power condominium in Asia as
appeasement. At the other extreme, he discredits the idea of trying
to delay or derail China's rise as too confrontational. A third
option, "enhanced engagement," is fine as far as it goes, but it
places too much hope in the willingness of Chinese policymakers to
cooperate with an opponent whose interests are not identical to
their own. Instead, he recommends that the United States set proper
boundaries for China's rise by maintaining a favorable balance of
power in Asia. This will require the United States to undertake
"costly and difficult measures," such as maintaining its alliances
with Japan and South Korea and its cooperative relations with most
of China's other neighbors, continuing to upgrade its military
posture to match China's military modernization, and balancing its
transpacific trade relationships. In a version of "we have met the
enemy and he is us," Friedberg says that in order to do all this,
the United States must restore its economy, keep its scientific
edge, protect its advanced technology, and maintain its margin of
military advantage.
弗里德伯格将基辛格中美共治亚洲的设想斥为绥靖政策。他同时也弃绝另一个极端想法，即美国出手阻碍或破坏中国的崛起，称之过于敌对。第三个选项，即”紧密型互动”，则过于依赖中国决策层的配合意愿。因比，弗里德伯格提出第四个选项，即美国在亚洲保持优势力量，以此限制中国的成长空间。这将要求美国采取高成本且困难的措施，如保持与日韩的联盟、增强与中国邻国的合作关系、提升军力以应对中国军队的现代化建设、平衡中美贸易关系等等。弗里德伯格认为”我们最大的敌人就是我们自己”，因此，美国必须重振经济、保持科技领先优势、保持军事代差。
One can only say amen to the recommendation that the United States
pull up its socks. Such proposals are persuasive with or without
China in the picture, and it is well to reinforce them in the
context of China's rise. But few of them are controversial. That
they form the core of Friedberg's strategy is a sign that the
United States' future in Asia is not as hostage to China's rise as
is implied by the alarmist tone of his earlier chapters. China
cannot displace the United States from A only the United States
can. Friedberg's counsel resembles the essence of U.S. policy for
at least the last decade. Certainly, the Obama administration has
been working to do what Friedberg suggests. The United States is
hardly "on track to lose [its] geopolitical contest with
对于要求美国提升自身实力的建议我们只能说”阿门”，因为无论是否针对中国，这些建议都有说服力，只不过在中国崛起的背景下更迫切罢了。这些基本毫无争议的建议能成为弗里德伯格政策的核心，只能说明美国在亚洲的未来并不会象弗里德伯格暗示的那样与中国的崛起水火不容。中国不能将美国排挤出亚洲，只有美国能。弗里德伯格的提议与美国过去十多年的政策相似，毫无疑问，奥巴马目前仍会维持这一政策，在与中国的较力中，美国绝非处于下风。
The real target of Friedberg's criticism is not U.S. policy but
"China-watchers in academia, commerce, and government," whom he
accuses of stifling debate and of "willful, blinkered optimism."
Prominent among these is Kissinger, whom Friedberg characterizes as
part of a "Shanghai Coalition" (more plainly, a new China lobby)
that wants "to avoid criticism of China and to support good
relations." Friedberg's strongest disagreement with this group
concerns the place of human rights in Washington's China
弗里德伯格的批评对象不是美国政策而是美国”学界、商界以及政府内的中国观察家们”，他指责这些人打压不同声音并且盲目乐观。这批观察家的领军人物当属基辛格，弗里德伯格斥其为”上海联盟”的一部分（说白了就是中国说客），该联盟”力图避免批评中国以保持良好的双边关系”。弗里德伯格与”上海联盟”最大的分歧在于如何看待人权问题在美国对华政策的地位。
If a key technique of Sun-tzu-style diplomacy is to convince the
other side that certain issues are too culturally and politically
sensitive to be discussed, China seems to have secured that part of
the wei qi board when it comes to Kissinger's views on human
rights. Speaking of the immediate post-Tiananmen period, Kissinger
says that "the American advocates of human rights insisted on
values they considered universal" and that such universalism
"challenges the element of nuance by which foreign policy is
generally obliged to operate." He continues: "If adoption of
American principles of governance is made the central condition for
progress in all other areas of the relationship, deadlock is
inevitable." These statements combine three fallacies: that the
universality of international human rights is a matter of opinion
rather than international law, that human rights equals American
principles of governance, and that promoting human rights means
holding hostage progress in all other areas.
如果”孙子式的外交”的重点之一在于让对手明白有些议题在文化上、政治上过于敏感而无法讨论的话，基辛格的人权观已被中国牢牢掌握。1990年代末风波后，基辛格说道：美国人权斗士坚称人权乃普世价值，但这些”普世”论调与开展外交工作时所必须的灵活变通格格不入。他继续指出，如果采纳美国治国原则是讨论所有其它议题的前提条件，僵局将不可避免。基辛格的讲话有三大错误：将普世人权视为观点而非国际法；将人权等同于美国治国原则；认为推动人权会破坏所有其它领域的对话。
Friedberg's counterargument is persuasive. Showing softness on core
values will reinforce the view of many Chinese that the United
States is in decline, thus encouraging China to miscalculate U.S.
resolve. As Friedberg writes, "Soft-pedaling talk of freedom will
not reassure China's leaders as much as it will embolden them." He
tellingly applies Kissinger's insight into the emollient effects of
friendship to Kissinger himself, arguing that the Shanghai
Coalition's members are motivated in part by "the psychic rewards
that come from believing that they are helping to promote peace and
the gratification of being revered and well treated by
弗里德伯格对基辛格的反击是有说服力的。在事关核心价值的问题上示弱，只会令众多的中国人更加坚信美国正在走下坡路，由此误判美国的决心。诚如弗里德伯格所言：在自由问题上唯唯诺诺只会让中国领导人更加大胆。弗里德伯格还指出”友谊光环”对基辛格本人的影响，称”上海联盟”成员的动力来源于他们相信自己维护了和平、以及让他们十分受用的来自北京的尊敬和礼遇。
It is no wonder that Chinese statecraft aims to establish the
cultural relativity of human rights and to pose talk of human
rights as the enemy of friendship. After all, the failure to
respect human rights is a glaring weakness of Chinese power both at
home and abroad, whereas promoting human rights has been among the
United States' most successful maneuvers on the wei qi board of
world politics. What is surprising is that the United States'
master strategist wants to play this part of the game by Beijing's
rules. Would it not make more sense to emulate Chinese strategy
than to yield to it? Emphasizing the principled centrality of the
human rights idea to American ideology and keeping the issue active
in bilateral relations even though it cannot be solved would seem
to be -- along with exercising the United States' strengths in
other fields -- a good way to set the boundaries within which a
rising Chinese power can operate without threatening U.S.
interests.
中国将人权归诸于文化，并且把它变成区分敌友的分水岭，不足为怪。毕竟，人权问题无论对内对外，都是中国政府的弱项。然而推动人权是美国在世界政治棋盘上最为成功的一招，令人惊讶的是美国外交大师会在这一领域按中国的规矩落子。以其人之道还治其人之身岂不比屈服于中国更高明?在动用其它优势的同时，强调人权问题乃美国价值理念之核心、即使对方无法认同也要天天讲日日谈，这不失为给中国成长空间设限以保证美国利益的好方法。
Wu Guanzhong
Yesterday, the small park was bathed in sunshine and lots of kids
and elderly folks there enjoyed themselves very much. Today, the
sun has disappeared. It is a cold and gloomy winter day and looks
like snow. The park is deserted except for a solitary walker
wrapped in an overcoat with his head bent low. The disappearance of
the sun does affect his solitary walk at all. It seems that there
is no sun in his heart.
We are all closely related to the sun. We get up at sunrise and
fall into a heavy slumber after sunset until the sun reappears the
next day. We all love the sun and long for
sunrise.&Impression,Sunrise&is
a world-famous painting. “The setting sun shines with unrivalled
splendor” is a celebrated line from an ancient Chinese poem. The
sun endows Mother Nature with color and creates shadows for men.
Without shadows, we could be unable to see light. It is by means of
shadows that we find the world to be three-dimensional. It is
unhealthy to confine ourselves to shadows, nor is it healthy to
have no shadows in life. The sun has much to do with our health and
determines our life or death, survival or extinction.
People look at the sun and admire its glow, light and brilliance.
Men invented the lantern in imitation of the sun and continue to
love the lantern when they have the electric lamp because the sun
will always have the worship of all. It also appears most often in
drawings done by children. We see one and only one sun from the
earth. The sun is the sole ball of fire in the sky. Anything that
is the only one of its kind is often held up as great. Louis XIV
styled himself Solar King. But he nevertheless died, leaving his
potential successors to contend for the Solar-King throne.
The sun is the source of heat and the symbol of warmth. Sorrowful
people often complain that they have no sun in their hearts. People
dread the sun in sweltering summer days. The sun does not always
give us blessings. It may be a hypocrite, causing seedlings to
wither and plunging people into the depth of misery. While people
dread the sun, they admire the moon on summer evenings though, in
fact, its enchanting pale light is a reflection from the sun. the
sun goes on doing whatever it pleases, always shining on all alike,
be they wild grass, fresh flowers, worms, bats, skyscrapers,
deserts, wild country….
All in all, people can’t live without the all-powerful sun.
昨天，小公园里撒满了阳光，孩子们、老人们，喜洋洋一大群。今天，太阳不见了，阴冷阴冷的冬天，像要下雪了。公园里消失了人群，只有一个人裹着大衣低头独自行走，太阳的消失没有影响他独自行走，似乎他心中本来就没有太阳。
太阳与大家有关，人们跟着太阳起床，随着太阳的沉没而沉睡，等待明天的太阳。大家喜欢太阳，等着看日出，《日出的印象》是举世绘画名作，“夕阳无限好”是千古名句。太阳赋大自然色彩，太阳在人间创造了阴影。没有了阴影，也就看不清光明，有了阴影才认识世界原来是立体的。总是生活在阴影里不健康，生活中没有阴影也不健康，太阳控制着人们的健康，生死存亡。
人们看太阳，观赏其红、光、亮。参照太阳，人创造了灯笼。有了电灯，还爱灯笼，因为太阳永远令人膜拜，儿童画中出现最多的也就是太阳。地球上只能看到一个太阳，太阳是惟一，惟一往往被尊为最伟大，路易十四自称是太阳王，但路易十四还是死了，让别人去争太阳王的宝座。
太阳是热之源，是温暖的象征，悽怆之人常说失去了心中的太阳。赤日炎炎的酷暑，人们怕太阳，太阳并不总赐予幸福，它可能是伪君子，它令禾苗枯萎，荼毒生灵。当它被人畏惧时，夏夜的月色倒赢得了人们的青睐，其实月亮那点迷人的光，只是太阳的反照。太阳我行我素，永远这样放光芒，它一样对待野草、鲜花、蛆虫、蝙蝠、高楼大厦与沙漠洪荒……
人们终于还是离不开无比强烈的太阳。
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—————----translated by 张培基
Thomas&Becket作者：
Thomas Becket(circa 1118 & 29 December 1170)不是唯一殉道的坎特伯雷大主教，在John
Foxe的伟大作品《殉道史》里面，记载了Thomas Cranmer（2 July 1489 & 21 March
1556）的生平事迹，不知道是不是巧合，两位主教的名字都是Thomas，同时也都是忠于信仰的代表。
Becket是英国历史上唯一一个留下名字的平民，从出身上讲，他只是一个商人的儿子，能替国王处理法律事务完全是因为当时坎特伯雷大主教的推荐。同时，他是一个地道的伦敦人，喜欢美食，注重着装。开始的时候，他跟着当时的国王，亨利二世四处游走，处理各样琐碎的政务，通过长时间的相处，Becket自认为自己已经对国王的性格和处事方式了如指掌，他显然因过度自信而忽略了亨利的虚伪，这为其之后的结局做了铺垫。
<img TITLE="[转载]Thomas&&wbr&Becket" STYLE="BorDer-Top-WiDTH: 0 pADDinG-riGHT: 8 pADDinG-LeFT: 0 BorDer-LeFT-WiDTH: 0 BorDer-BoTToM-WiDTH: 0 pADDinG-BoTToM: 8 MArGin: 0 pADDinG-Top: 8 LisT-sTYLe-TYpe: BorDer-riGHT-WiDTH: 0px" HEIGHT="152" ALT="[转载]Thomas&&wbr&Becket" src="/blog7style/images/common/sg_trans.gif" real_src ="http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images//jpg/__thomasbecket203.jpg" WIDTH="203" NAME="il_fi" />
接下来，Becket的世俗让他得到了国家的最高职位——坎特伯雷大主教的位置，而亨利也想让他在这个位置上为他服务，虽然事实证明他错了。在当时的英国，教会和国王还存在着权力之争，国王认为教会应该对国王负责，而教会认为国王应该服从教会。亨利梦想着Becket的就职可以改变国王和教会的关系，然而，接下来发生的事情完全出乎国王的意料，Becket公开抨击亨利的统治。亨利召开会议颁布无条件服从禁止令，Becket明白这是国王在试图控制教会，所以拒绝了这一要求，并遭到了审判，罪名是挪用教会资金，这一审判将Becket带入绝境，于是，他和一些跟随者逃到了法国Portigny的西多会修道院（Cistercian
Abbey)，在那里，他建立了一个“流亡政府”。
<img TITLE="[转载]Thomas&&wbr&Becket" STYLE="BorDer-Top-WiDTH: 0 pADDinG-riGHT: 0 pADDinG-LeFT: 0 BorDer-LeFT-WiDTH: 0 BorDer-BoTToM-WiDTH: 0 pADDinG-BoTToM: 0 MArGin: 0 pADDinG-Top: 0 LisT-sTYLe-TYpe: BorDer-riGHT-WiDTH: 0px" HEIGHT="319" ALT="108_BecketHenryII.jpg - 91193 Bytes" src="/blog7style/images/common/sg_trans.gif" real_src ="http://www.traditioninaction.org/SOD/SODimages3/108_BecketHenryII.jpg" WIDTH="400" BORDER="0" NAME="image_operate_01159" />
两年后，二人重新和好，国王发布了和平宣言，并恢复了Becket的所有权利。这代表着国王宽恕了Becket的所有一切，并希望Becket也宽恕所有国王跟随者的错误，然而这遭到了Becket的拒绝。二人的最后一次见面是在莱茵河边，亨利希望Becket能照国王所要求的一切去做，但Becket耸了耸肩说：“上帝不允许”。
日，Becket走进坎特伯雷大教堂，诅咒在他被放逐期间反对他的那些人，并将他们从教会开除。这些被开除的人跑到亨利那里大肆批判Becket是个叛国者，国王发了烈怒，质问：“难道没有一个人帮我解决掉这个出身低微的人吗？”当然有，四个骑士没等国王发出命令，便离开了诺曼底来到了约克郡。同年的12月29日，他们来到了坎特伯雷大教堂，找到了Becket，并要求他到国王那里认罪。意识到危险的主教没有选择逃离，而是选择继续他的祷告，并敞开门迎接做礼拜的人——他已经做了殉道的决定。
在教堂一侧的通道上，骑士拔出了剑问道“叛国者在哪里？”“我在这里”Becket回答，“但是没有叛国者，只有上帝的仆人”。就这样，Becket被砍下了头颅，结束了他52年的生命，他死的时候，除了两个跟随者，其他人都吓得躲了起来。
<img TITLE="[转载]Thomas&&wbr&Becket" STYLE="BorDer-Top-WiDTH: 0 pADDinG-riGHT: 0 pADDinG-LeFT: 0 BorDer-LeFT-WiDTH: 0 BorDer-BoTToM-WiDTH: 0 pADDinG-BoTToM: 0 MArGin: 0 WiDTH: 255 pADDinG-Top: 0 LisT-sTYLe-TYpe: HeiGHT: 257 BorDer-riGHT-WiDTH: 0px" HEIGHT="176" ALT="[转载]Thomas&&wbr&Becket" src="/blog7style/images/common/sg_trans.gif" real_src ="/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcT0P1qsNtYfIDEuh-Ydc1yMI0Ydue8Ry4JqEOfMcrriw4aSQ-fjWQ" WIDTH="174" NAME="image_operate_45921" DATA-WIDTH="174" DATA-HEIGHT="176" />
当门徒们为Becket安葬时，感人的一幕出现了，他们发现在华丽的主教服饰之下，是一件爬满虱子的毛衬衣——Becket是一个谦逊的人，是一个禁欲者，他从来没想过当国王，他是一个圣者。
<img TITLE="[转载]Thomas&&wbr&Becket" STYLE="BorDer-Top-WiDTH: 0 pADDinG-riGHT: 0 pADDinG-LeFT: 0 BorDer-LeFT-WiDTH: 0 BorDer-BoTToM-WiDTH: 0 pADDinG-BoTToM: 0 MArGin: 0 WiDTH: 257 pADDinG-Top: 0 LisT-sTYLe-TYpe: HeiGHT: 196 BorDer-riGHT-WiDTH: 0px" HEIGHT="196" ALT="[转载]Thomas&&wbr&Becket" src="/blog7style/images/common/sg_trans.gif" real_src ="/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcRJX2eW_r5GC5Zyf-3rfjx61jcUEcRVtP_7_WeFsch0_v4Mp7Jm" WIDTH="257" NAME="rg_hi" DATA-WIDTH="257" DATA-HEIGHT="196" />
最终，四个真正的凶手只被从轻发落，而亨利二世本人，则成为了最大的王族罪人。
Becket脾气暴躁，顽固，夸张，但他对教会的观点却一直延续了下去。
社会生存的75条忠告！
01．犯了错误就该诚实地认错——狡辩、诿过只会害了自己。
02．朋友之间要保持距离——这样的友谊才能长久。
&&03．钱追人，人追健康——有了健康，还怕挣不到钱么？
&&04．别轻易转行——转行的风险很高，最好不要轻率为之。
&&05．适度地抬高身价——在就业市场中，人也是一种商品。
&&06．把敬业变成习惯——从长期看是为了自己。
&&07．运用累积法壮大资产——不求快，不求多，不中断。
&&08．忍一时，争千秋形势比人强时，必须忍。
&&09．与其你死我活，不如你活我也活——这就是双赢，是良性竞争。
&&10．以“播种”的心态经营人际关系——种子播得越早越坚韧。
&&11．做事切勿率性而为——率性而为只会害了自己。
&&12．遇到魔鬼型的主管时——接受他的磨练可让你的性格越来越坚韧。
&&13．不要当众和主管吵架——那会让你无路可走，只有走人。
&&14．向不同行业的人学习新知识——记住，要用请教的态度。
&&15．所有的困难都是好事——这是老天爷在磨练你，目的是把重任交给你。
&&16．用吃亏就是占便宜的心态做人做事——那样你就可以迅速长大。
&&17．不要在失意者面前谈论你的得意——那样伤害你的人际关系。
&&18．不要小看守时这件事——守时是对别人的尊重。
&&19．用时间来看人——时间是检验大师。
&&20．用打听来看人——把获得的信息汇总，就可以了解那个人。
&&21．建立一个朋友档案——以免人到用时方恨少。
&&22．扩大交友圈——主动出击，不要等别人上门找你。
&&23．保持交友的弹性——敌人也可以变成朋友。
&&24．要交喜欢“修理”你的朋友——这种朋友是你的人生导师。
&&25．毛遂自荐，好处多多——让别人看到你，知道你的存在，知道你的能力。
&&26．小心突然升温的友情——对待这种友情的正确态度是：不推不迎，礼尚往来。
&&27．做老二，不做老大——老大没当好，容易变成老三老四。
&&28．做人要中规中矩——目的是赢得他人的尊重和信赖。
&&29．用“物质利”换取“人情利”——“物质利”是一时的，“人情利”是长远的。
&&30．不要独想荣耀——今天独享荣耀，明天可能就可能独吞苦果。
&&31．找一位“衣食父母”——那个人可减少你摸索的时间。
&&32．找一位对手来跟——跟住他，最终超越他。
&&33．用耐心把冷板凳坐热——冷板凳都坐过了，还有什么好怕的呢？
&&34．套用别人的成功模式——别人的成功模式可成为一种指引，让你有方向可循。
&&35．偷偷地把自己当成老板或主管——逐渐培养自己当老板或主管的能力。
&&36．不要满足于眼前的小成就——问问自己：我这辈子就这样了吗？
&&37．让自己尽快成为本行的专家——只要功夫深，铁杵磨成针。
&&38．不要有怀才不遇的想法——怀才不遇多半是自己造成的。
&&39．跌倒了，一定要爬起来——不爬起来，别人会看不起你，你自己也会失去机会。
&&40．不要为失败找借口——应该直面失败，并迅速找出失败的原因。
&&41．改变环境或改变自己——与其改变环境，不如改变自己。
&&42．不打没有把握的仗——生命是经不起一次次的浪费的。
&&43．把反省自己当成每日的功课——因为你不是完美的，会说错话，也会做错事。
&&44．碰到低调时，自己鼓励自己——千万别蚯螅
&&45．依靠别人的智能做事——一个人的能力是有限的。
&&46．时时都要有危机意识——别以为你的命好运气也好。
&&47．主角配角都能演，台上台下都自在——面对人生，要练就能屈能伸的个性。
&&48．要学会控制自己的情绪——这是成熟的一个最重要的标志。
&&49．做乌龟，不做兔子——有兔子资质的人容易骄傲，而骄傲会成为成功路上的绊脚石。
&&50．先做小事，先赚小钱——为做大事赚大钱积累经验。
&&51．别让过去的失败捆住你的手脚，否则永远难成大事。
&&52．像蟑螂一样活着——人如果有蟑螂的韧性，还有什么日子不能过呢？
&&53．靠实力，不靠派系——派系不是永远的，实力才是你能依靠一生的东西。
&&54．自己发光，不要等别人把你磨光——谁有空、有心情去认真地“磨”你呢？
&&55．逢山开路，遇水架桥——要学会投其所好。
&&56．永远跑在下属的前面——权力领导、情义领导都不如才能领导。
&&57．“新官上任三把火”有必要——要大声地告诉别人：我来了。
58．只要5毛钱，不要1块钱——拿一块钱的机会只有一次。
&&59．放下架子，路就会越走越宽——架子只会捆住你的手脚。
&&60．话别说得太圆满——目的是给意外留有余地，以免下不了台。
&&61．尽快成为你所在的那一行的专家——只要努力就会成功。
&&62．多赞美别人——不用花钱，就能使人快乐，何乐而不为呢？
&&63．尊重别人的领土范围——别因为疏忽引发不必要的麻烦。
&&64．不要轻易吐露你的失意——以免被人认为你软弱无能。
&&65．人际关系的原则是：有舍才有得——你满足了对方，对方才会满足你。
&&66．不要忽略面子问题——不给面子的行为最容易引起是非。
&&67．妥善处理与小人的关系——不要依附他，也不要得罪他。
&&68．最好不要挡住别人的财路——与其挡人财路，不如自己别辟财路。
&&69．用低姿态化解别人的嫉妒——嫉妒是烈火，会烧毁一个人。
&&70．做人做事不必面面俱到——总会有人不满意你。
&&71．认识并运用人性中的自私——要想办法用别人的自私为自己谋利。
&&72．顺着毛摸，他就会听你的——脾气再大、城府再深、个性再强的人也吃不消这招。
&&73．以积极的作为推动否极泰来——坚持住，努力向上，积累能力。
&&74．以戒备谨慎的心态延缓盛极而衰的时间——很多失败都是在兴盛时埋下的伏笔。
&&75．万事俱备，花自然会开——努力就行了，花什么时候开由老天爷安排。
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