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Can China successfully educate its future workforce?
By Sarah Butrymowicz
Migrant students play during a mid-day break at Dexin School in Kunming, China. (Photo by Sarah Butrymowicz)
KUNMING, China&With dirt streaking their faces and clothes, children shout and run around a concrete courtyard that doubles as a playground at the Dexin School. Minutes later, they squirm in their seats after being corralled into classrooms with bars on the windows. Their voices can be heard disrupting their English class as American volunteers try to get them to repeat phrases like &You are beautiful.&
This private school in a provincial capital of southern China educates some of the country&s most disadvantaged students. They are all so-called &migrant& students who have moved with their parents from the countryside to cities. At Dexin, volunteers and often-under qualified teachers work on a shoestring budget with impoverished students whose parents might earn as little as $2 a day. Parents choose Dexin and other schools like it because they are shut out of public institutions.
While China aims to continue modernizing its economy, the plight of millions of under-educated migrant children at Dexin and other substandard urban schools could jeopardize the nation&s ability to grow and develop a skilled workforce, experts warn.
Chinese law prohibits people from moving without government approval, a policy aimed at keeping its 1.3 billion citizens evenly distributed. Even so, hundreds of millions have fled rural areas to China&s cities in recent decades in hopes of finding work, most often in low-wage, low-skill jobs. Once they arrive, municipal governments are typically either unwilling or unable to offer public services like health care and education.
MORE COVERAGE
In an effort to help educate this growing segment of the population, nonprofits and non-governmental organizations&as well as individual citizens&have set up thousands of schools, mostly at the elementary level, for millions of migrant children. At many, like at Dexin, finding enough teachers and funding to get by can be a herculean task.&The result is frequently a subpar education that researchers say could harm the whole country in the long run.
&It&s a large, enormous and growing problem, and it requires the immediate attention of China&s national authorities,& said Matthew Boswell, a project manager at Stanford University&s&&(REAP), which is working to reduce China&s rural-urban education achievement gap. &I don&t see any sign of that happening instantly, but the problem will only get bigger.&
China has depended on urbanization to fuel its growing economy,&but China&s migrant student population is of increasing concern. For China to achieve superpower status, its workforce needs to be more literate and better educated, according to Boswell.
In 2010, China stunned the world when 15-year-olds from Shanghai beat out their peers around the globe on international assessments in reading, math and science. (American 15-year-olds finished in the middle of the pack.) China&s reluctance to provide quality schooling to all of its students, though, could result in millions of migrant children becoming unemployable as adults.
&Those kids growing up in urban schools, they&ll probably have no problem,& Boswell said. &The people who are the same age as them but grew up in a migrant community, there&s just no way& they&ll be able to compete.
&I can&t think of other problems that have such far-reaching impacts on society,& said Henan Cheng, a researcher at Loyola University Chicago who recently studied migrant education here in Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan province. &Just think of the size of the migrant population.&
Migrant students look on as American high school volunteers teach them English phrases. (Photo by Sarah Butrymowicz)
Exact figures aren&t available, but some nonprofits estimate that there are more than 225 million migrants living in Chinese cities. Just over 10 percent of them, or 25 million, are children. (Many parents leave their children behind with relatives when they move to urban areas in search of work.) As urban migration continues, authorities are bracing for more than 350 million migrants by the year 2050.
On paper, the situation is improving. In 2006, the Chinese government first allowed migrant children to enroll in public schools, and some local governments now offer subsidies to private migrant schools. Yet specific policies are decided at the municipal level, and insurmountable barriers often keep migrant students out of public schools.
In some cities, students must obtain seven different official certificates&documenting, for instance, where they were born&before they can enroll in public schools. Migrant students may also be required to pay tuition as high as 1,000 RMB a semester&about $150&which their city-born peers aren&t charged, according to&, a China-based nonprofit that runs schools and community centers for migrant children in Beijing.
In Kunming, where the local government has made an effort to increase migrant access to education over the last five years, about 50 percent of migrant students are able to attend pubic schools, Cheng said. Yet these students are often segregated from urban children and sent to the worst public schools. The rest&if they go to school at all&attend schools like Dexin.
At Dexin, about two-thirds of students pay annual tuition of a few hundred RMB&or about $40 to $60&while families who can&t come up with the money attend for free, second-year teacher Zhao Gui Shun said through a translator. For parents who work as day-laborers, it may take a month to earn enough for tuition. Dexin also receives a small government subsidy: about $8 a year for each of its 400 children.
The tight budget takes its toll, particularly when it comes to finding teachers. Zhao described Dexin&s employees as &half-teacher, half-volunteer,& noting that their salaries are significantly lower than their peers in regular public schools.
A migrant girl takes a nap at Xing Ling School in Kunming, China at the end of the school day. (Photo by Sarah Butrymowicz)
The students at migrant schools also tend to have behavior problems and come from unstable homes. &All the parents care about is making enough money [to make ends meet],& said Zhao, who was called out of a meeting with a visitor at one point to calm a class of shrieking elementary children that teenage volunteers from America were struggling to control. &They don&t realize they have to help teach kids.&
Such factors lead many migrant schools to have high teacher turnover rates and great difficulty in attracting qualified candidates. According to a 2011 study by REAP, only 48 percent of teachers in migrant schools in Beijing had a college degree. Still, teachers must use the same elementary-school curriculum that conventional public schools do&covering all the basics of math, science, history and Chinese, for instance&to prepare those who plan on taking the middle-school entrance exam.
The same study also found that, although migrant students outperformed students in poor rural areas, they did worse than students in urban public schools. Migrant students who were able to enroll in public schools, however, did significantly better on tests than their peers in migrant-only schools. The report&s authors concluded that &the longer students are enrolled in migrant schools, the worse their performance becomes.&
Teachers like Zhao still feel their work is hugely important, especially when compared to the alternative for migrant children. &If it weren&t for this school, maybe some kids would just pick up food on the street or become beggars,& Zhao said. &There&s no future for them.&
在中国，“被丢下的”
(Subscribe to&World Policy Journal&)
From the Summer Issue ""
By Helen Gao
GUANG&AN, China&Jiang Xin leaves school at 2:30 p.m. everyday. On his way home, the 8-year-old usually lingers by the rice fields with his friends for an hour or so, squatting on the edge of a dirt road, where trucks loaded with coal roar by. They play with pebbles, exchange school gossip, or punch the buttons of Jiang&s video game player, which he wrapped in tape to prevent from falling apart. Their cattle stand together in a nearby field, grazing on grass stalks.
Around 3:30, the children fetch their cattle and head home. Jiang lives in a two-story shack on a small hill with his brother and grandparents. Soon after he leads the cattle into the pen and latches the gate, his grandparents return from a long day working in the fields, sometimes carrying large bundles of wood to add to their stock that already fills the upper floor of their house. Around 4 p.m., his 11-year-old brother, Jiang Heng, who goes to school in the town, trudges up the hill. The brothers are usually glued to the television until dinnertime, ignoring their grandparents& call for them to finish their homework. &With the farm work and all, sometimes I really can&t manage them,& says Xiao Chuntao, the brothers& 58-year-old grandmother, as she peels peanuts while watching over her grandsons, who are engrossed in the Japanese TV series &Ultraman.&&&
Like many others in Guang&an, which means the village of &Brightness and Peace,& the Jiang family consists of empty-nest elders and left-behind children. Perched atop a mountain near the southwest boundary of the central province of Hunan, the village has a population of around 1,400. Since the early 1990s, more than half of the villagers have decamped to the cities to make a better living. When the young and able-bodied leave, their children usually remain in the care of their paternal grandparents, in many cases only months after they are born.
SO MANY LEFT BEHIND
The most recent survey from the All-China Women&s Federation found some 61 million &left-behind children& across China, who are growing up without one or both parents&a population larger than California and New York combined. Close to 33 percent are raised by their grandparents, another 10.7 percent by other villagers or relatives, and at least 2.06 million, according to the survey, are forced to fend for themselves. It is one of the darker side effects of China&s manufacturing and construction-fueled economic boom, which has created a vast number of low-skill jobs in coastal provinces, luring hundreds of millions of laborers away from their impoverished hometowns.
These young migrants, who are parents of pre-school or school-aged children, face a difficult decision after relocating.&If they decide to bring their children with them into the cities, urban living costs could prove debilitating given the parents& paltry salary.&A range of social and institutional hurdles prevent the children from becoming fully integrated urban citizens. At the same time, if the parents choose to leave their children in their rural hometowns, the family will have to bear years of painful separation, which often takes a physical as well as psychological toll on the young generation.
Despite their backbreaking work in cities, migrants earn considerably less than urban natives.&A 2011 survey by the Ministry of Human Resources shows that the average monthly salary for migrant workers was slightly over 2,000 RMB ($323), compared to the national average of 3,200 RMB ($510).&These amounts already represent a significant increase from just half a decade earlier, but have been largely offset by several rounds of nationwide post-financial-crisis&inflation. In cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen, where the average cost of living approaches New York City&s, migrants try to scrap by while saving every extra yuan to send home. Raising their children in such an environment, which entails extra costs for food, clothing, schooling, and other expenses, is beyond the means of many parents.
Another major hurdle that discourages migrant parents from bringing their children into cities is China&s&hukou, or household registration, system. Sometimes likened to China&s &internal passport,& the system ties social benefits such as health care and free education to each person&s hometown. Migrant children can only receive government subsidies on their education if they go to school near where they were born, and they have to pay prohibitively high tuition if they hope to enroll in urban schools.&Furthermore, in many crowded Chinese metropolises, where a large number of local students vie for limited educational resources, some public schools simply refuse to take migrant children.&Others make the enrollment standards so stringent&by demanding, for example, official documents and certificates rarely granted to migrants&that it&s virtually impossible for migrants to meet them.&In Beijing alone, more than 140,000 migrant children are shut out of the public education system, according to government statistics that likely vastly underestimate the number.&Some of these students find their way to private schools set up for migrants, which usually charge hefty tuition due to their lack of government subsidies, and offer only subpar education.
Facing economic hardship and the hurdles posed by the&hukou&system, many migrant parents find migrating with their children an unrealistic option. They are left only with the difficult alternative of leaving their children behind as they depart for distant cities. These boys and girls, the so-called &left-behind children,& are thus separated from their parents in many cases from birth, and must stumble through their childhood and early teenage years without proper physical care or emotional guidance.
The issue of left-behind children surged to the forefront of public attention at the end of last year when five boys, cousins aged nine to 13, were found dead in a rolling trash bin in the southwestern province of Guizhou. The likely cause of death was carbon monoxide poisoning. The children had climbed into the bin to take shelter from the cold and lit a fire inside. With their parents seeking work in the coastal regions, the youths received little adult oversight during their lives and were left to wander the streets.
While the tragedy in Guizhou was an extreme case, it sparked a national discussion among Chinese citizens on the plight of migrant children, the major obstacles they face, and the long-term effects created for both these children and the society. The challenges and damaging effects of growing up as left-behind children are mostly manifested in their daily lives, as demonstrated by the experience of children in Guang&an village.
In the long run, the fate of these children is increasingly uncertain.&The implications of their incomplete upbringing, compounded by larger social woes such as uneven educational opportunities and widening income disparities, allow little upward social mobility, even through hard work.&A slowing and transforming economy means they will less likely be able to reap the benefit of the nation&s manufacturing boom by performing low-skill jobs as their parents did.&Whether China can create a caring, supportive environment for these children and help them develop into productive participants of society could test China&s ability to carry out its grand national scheme of urbanization and keep its economy thriving in the years ahead.
LEFT BEHIND AS A FACT OF LIFE
In Guang&an it is so common for children to grow up without their parents around that both the children and their grandparents take it as a fact of life. &Kids in the countryside are not the same as those city children,& says Fan Renshu, principal of the village elementary school. &City children are too reliant on their parents. Rural kids are more independent. They are used to not having parents around.&
It certainly seems to be the case with the Jiang brothers. Their parents, like most migrant workers in the village, toil in factories in nearby Guangdong province. Both work for a foreign handbag manufacturer in Shenzhen, whose brand neither of Jiang&s grandparents can name. Due to the high transportation cost&around 2,000 RMB ($318) round trip for the both of them, only slightly less than their combined monthly salaries&and their tight work schedule, the parents usually return home only once a year during the Chinese New Year, bearing bags of toys and new clothes for their sons.
Last year, however, the couple made an exception. They rushed home in October, when news arrived that the grandparents were attacked by wild bees while cutting wood in the mountains. Xiao, the grandmother, with multiple stings on her head, was in critical condition. The medical bills took a huge bite out of the family&s meager savings. Fortunately, both grandparents recovered quickly. The parents didn&t stay long before they had to get back to work, but as result of the trip, they did not come home for the Chinese New Year in February. &They&ve come back twice last year already,& Jiang Heng, the elder grandson, explains matter-of-factly. &That&s too many times. It has exceeded their quota.&
During the rest of the year, Jiang&s parents call home about once a month. On the phone, the brothers answer their questions in monosyllables, and spend the rest of the time reciting to them passages from their school textbooks. Asked if they remember their parents& faces, both brothers only flash a shy smile. &My grandchildren have spent the longest time with us, so they are the closest to us,& says Jiang Zhonghan, the grandfather, with a proud smile.
DAMAGING THE LEFT BEHIND
Most adults in Guang&an, such as Fan, do not fully realize the potential damage the experience of growing up as left-behind children can impose on the village&s next generation. After all, under Chinese family tradition, it is not uncommon for grandparents to assist parents in childrearing. Most grandparents here, like the Jiangs, look after their grandchildren with great attentiveness and love. Circumstances, however, often require them to become the primary caregivers to children, stretching the boundaries of their capacity. In many cases, such unconventional family arrangements can damage the children&s physical and psychological well-being.&
Despite their frailness, the grandparents in Guang&an typically take care of their grandchildren while supporting the family financially by carrying out heavy farm work. Backbreaking jobs on the village&s rice paddies or cornfields often claim the majority of grandparents& attention during planting and harvesting seasons.&As much as they hope to carry out their childrearing duties conscientiously, they find the task difficult to accomplish, and in such cases, accidents proliferate.
Jiang Mi, a quiet, skinny 8-year-old girl in Guang&an, suffers from a partial hearing loss in her left ear. It was caused by an infection a few years ago, when her grandmother washed her hair and didn&t notice the water that entered her ears. Fan, the elementary school principal, recalls an accident from a neighboring village in 2009. A boy and girl fell down a well and drowned when their grandparents failed to keep a proper eye on them. In another tragedy, a boy left at home with his grandfather in a nearby county died after eating rat poison by mistake. His grandfather, overwhelmed by guilt, committed suicide soon afterward.
Given the frequency of such incidents nationwide, only a small number are ever reported by the state media. When they are, like the five deaths in Guizhou, they are chilling reminders of the precarious condition in which some left-behind children live, due to lack of adult care. Even less visible to the Chinese public than the physical damage of left-behind children may be the damage on their psychological stability and character.
&Grandparents usually pay more attention to the grandchildren&s physical health, making sure they have enough to eat and wear, and less to their character and morality,& says Jiang Nengjie, 27, a Guang&an resident making a documentary about left-behind children. (Most of the village members share the same family name, Jiang, but are not closely related.) &When the children reach puberty, many will suddenly turn rebellious, and then it is too late for their grandparents to try to rein them in.&
Juvenile delinquency among left-behind children has become an issue of major concern.&Chinese legal statistics reveal that in 2010 left-behind children comprise 70 percent of juvenile offenders. Without effective adult supervision, many turn to alcohol and drugs, while others squander their days in gambling parlors and Internet cafes. In the book&Wounded Villages, Nie Mao, a professor of humanities at Central South University and an expert on left-behind children, documents several cases of such children who fell between the cracks in Chinese society. One 15-year-old boy from Hunan province broke into an apartment and murdered the owner for 300 RMB ($48) to pay for his hours in an Internet caf&, while his father toiled at low-paying jobs in Guangdong.
&The problems in the lives of left-behind children are widespread and deep-rooted. They have the potential to lead to severe consequences through an insidious process,& writes Nie. &They don&t manifest themselves in every child, but when they do, it shows the seriousness of the situation.&
LIFE BETWEEN CITY AND VILLAGE
Jiang Nengjie, the documentary filmmaker, has been tracking three families in Guang&an since 2009 to record their ways of coping with the absence of the middle generation in their households. During her Chinese New Year visit in 2011, Jiang Heng&s mother, Ye Haiping, confessed to Nengjie her concerns about her in-laws& ability to supervise her sons& education. &I&m not at home, so nobody will discipline the boys except their grandparents,& she sighed. &But the grandparents don&t understand [my sons& schoolwork], and they get fooled every time when the boys lie to them saying they&ve finished their homework.&
Xiao, the grandmother, bemoans the thin filial bond her grandsons feel toward their parents. &Nowadays, children don&t feel attached to their parents, because, well, [the parents] didn&t raise them. & There is a song called &Mother is the Best Person on Earth.& I think it should in fact be &Grandmother is the Best Person on Earth,&& she says without a smile.&&&
Though dissatisfied with the present arrangement, neither the parents nor the grandparents see an alternative. The stark income disparity between rural and urban China makes the parents& choice between leaving home or staying no choice at all. With their jobs in the handbag factory in Shenzhen, the parents have a combined net income of 30,000 RMB ($4,780) per year&meager given the jobs& strict schedule and physical demands. But it still dwarfs the 8,000 RMB ($1,275) the grandparents collect annually through farming. The parents send back 500 RMB ($80) per month to support the family.
Nationwide, the income gap between rural and urban China has widened to a staggering level. Incomes in urban China are more than five times the level in rural regions. This income ratio has increased 26 percent from 1997 and 68 percent since 1985. Such a disparity is driving new waves of younger migrants like Jiang&s parents into the cities every year, accelerating the urban economic engine while leaving the rural areas trailing further behind.&&&&&&&&&&&
Some parents from Guang&an have brought their children along on their migrant journey. But Jiang Zhonghan and Xiao Chuntao agree it was not an option the parents had considered. Registered under the system as rural residents in Hunan province, if Jiang Xin and Jiang Heng were to move with their parents to Shenzhen, in Guangdong province, they would be barred from attending local public elementary schools and shunted to private schools set up for migrants. The tuition for these schools, which could reach 2,000 RMB ($320) per semester, would deal a heavy blow to the parents& modest living in the second most expensive city in mainland China, where their combined salary is only 2,500 RMB ($400) per month.One summer, Jiang Heng recalls, he and his brother visited their parents in Shenzhen during school vacation. It was the longest period of time in their memory that they had spent with their parents, but the reunion was not a peaceful one. Without time to watch over their sons and worrying about their potential misbehavior, the parents had no choice but to lock them in their tiny apartment while they toiled on the assembly lines. The brothers remember spending most of the summer crying to themselves behind a locked door.
&From then on, whenever they cry, I warn them: &If you cry for another minute, I&ll send you to your dad.& Then they immediately stop,& says Xiao.
EDUCATION OR MIGRATION
Jiang Xin and Jiang Heng now attend local schools and are in second and fifth grade respectively. Jiang Xin&s school, Guangming Elementary School, located inside the village, runs from pre-school through second grade. The number of students is dwindling&from a peak of over 300 in late 1980s to the current 53&a result of birth planning laws, a change in families& traditional mindset that preferred large numbers of offspring, and young couples& mass migration to cities. The school was nearly shuttered a few years ago in a wave of rural elementary school closings and mergers ordered by the central government. The former village head, 73-year-old Jiang Zhongshu, fought to keep it open. It is currently staffed by three teachers. Fan, the principal, is scheduled to retire next year, and with the job&s puny salary and secluded location, the school is struggling to find a replacement.&&&&&&&&
Jiang Heng goes to Zhongxin Elementary School that&s located in a larger town, an hour and a half by foot from his own village. It is the nearest school to the Jiang family that offers education beyond second grade, and where all graduates of the village elementary school are expected to proceed with their education. Heng&s grades were poor when he first transferred to the school, but he gradually caught up. Now he ranks 15 in his class of 78&a decent performance, but needing further improvement if he hopes to win a coveted spot in a county high school. Few children in Guang&an attend high school. Even fewer go to college. The vast majority head to factories in coastal provinces like Guangdong and Zhejiang after graduating from junior high school at the age of 16.
&The conditions here cannot compare to the cities,& Jiang Nengjie, the filmmaker,&says on a walk along the dirt road tracing around the rice paddies in the village. He is one of the few college graduates in the village. &If you go to school in a place like this, what is the chance of you landing in a decent college?&
China&s exam-oriented educational system, with a student&s college placement dependent solely on performance in the nation college entrance exam, is traditionally considered a social leveler that gives every student an equal chance to succeed. In recent years, most colleges have expanded enrollment, churning out a ballooning number of graduates, but the top schools have largely maintained their size. With an increasing number of students gaining access to formal education, the competition to get into the top schools, always cutthroat, has reached the boiling point.
Middle-class urban parents attempt to boost their children&s academic performance by hiring private tutors, filling their weekends with cram classes.&Most children in rural areas receive virtually no guidance from parents, who work far away and have little surplus income to invest in their education.&Many of their teachers at school do not have college degrees themselves. The gap in the availability of educational resources between rural and urban China essentially bars left-behind children with rural backgrounds from elite educational institutions. Peking University, one of the nation&s top schools, admitted around 30 percent of its students from rural areas from 1978 to 1998, but that number has fallen to 10 percent in recent years. At Tsinghua University,&commonly touted as China&s MIT, rural students represented only 17 percent its student body in 2010, while 62 percent of the students taking the national college entrance exam that year were of rural origin.
Even for those rural students who worked their way into universities, it&s questionable if their accomplishment will lead to a step upward in their lives.&China&s university graduates quadrupled in the past decade, reaching eight million a year. As a result, a college diploma is quickly losing its luster among employers. That is especially the case for graduates from the less prestigious community colleges and polytechnic institutes, where students tend to be from poor or rural backgrounds. According to China&s education ministry, last year 80 percent of students at such institutes were the first in their families to receive higher education.
Many of these schools charge up to twice as much tuition as elite universities, due to the limited subsidies they receive from the government. Instead of teaching general knowledge courses, they offer vocational training in narrow and specialized fields&automobile repair, hairdressing, computer programming&and are often operated jointly with large factories.&A large number of students find themselves funneled to these factories upon graduation, undertaking simple manual work they could have performed without any professional training.&Such prospects have convinced an increasing number of rural students to forgo higher education. &Many people believe that rather than going to high school and university, which doesn&t guarantee anything, it makes much more sense to become a migrant worker instead and start making money early,& says Nengjie.
For now, the Jiang family is betting their hopes for the two brothers on&education. &We want them to study well and go to high school. We don&t even ask them to share the work in the house and on the farm,& says Xiao.&&&&&&&&&&&
&When dad and mom come home for Chinese New Year, I&d ask them if they are tired from working,& Heng cuts in with the air of a grown-up. &They&d say, &Not tired if you achieve good grades.&& He seems less certain about his future. &I&ll have to see when I grow up,& he continues. Though for now, he adds, his dream is to own a &learning machine,& a study tool popular among his friends that teaches English through listening practices and vocabulary games. At 11, Heng will face the decision about his future in four years. Most older teenagers in the village have already flocked eastward to the boomtowns on the coast. Some join the same factories where their parents have worked for decades to put them through school, with the hope that they would have a brighter future. After years of separation, the families are reunited at long last&on the assembly lines.
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?
The issue of left-behind children is both a matter of individual misfortune and a national concern.&The Chinese economy is at a critical crossroads, where the manufacturing and construction-based structure is yielding diminishing returns, while the government has reiterated its hope to turn domestic consumption into the nation&s next growth engine.&In a decade or less, the 58 million left-behind children will have finished their time in the education system and will flock to the cities.&Some will enter factories and construction sites. But others, due to a dwindling number of such jobs or their own higher expectations, will look elsewhere. Some among them, feeling forgotten by their family and forsaken by&society, may live on the instant gratifications offered by drugs, sex, and the Internet, or turn to illicit activities, a worrying trend the society is already witnessing today.&How to incorporate children of migrant workers into the modern city life, equip them with skills marketable in China&s future economic model, and turn them from potential social liabilities to valuable human capital will be among the key challenges on the government&s agenda in the years ahead.
By 2030, the Chinese government has announced that one billion of its citizens will live in cities. That means urbanizing 310 million rural residents in the next 17 years, on top of the nation&s existing urban population of 690 million. Left-behind children will occupy a significant chunk of that population.&Right now, the biggest barrier that disables them and their parents from settling in cities are the social benefits&most importantly, free schooling&denied to them as a result of the&hukou&system.&That is where change will have to start and where reforms, though gradual, are already taking place.
In recent years, major cities across China started to relax their rules that restrict migrant children from attending local schools. In provincial cities such as Wuhan, Nanjing, and Yueyang, over 90 percent of migrant children have been assigned to public schools in the vicinity, according to government reports. In cities like Beijing and Shanghai, where the large number of migrant students makes the task of absorbing them more daunting, local governments have been slowly expanding the number of public schools that accept migrant children, while experimenting with a variety of methods to manage their inflow. Beijing, for example, allows migrant children to attend state schools if their parents can produce five separate documents proving their local employment and residence status. Both Beijing and Shanghai are formulating plans that will enable migrant children who attended middle schools to take the test for local vocational schools. Guangdong, China&s manufacturing heartland, aims to allow students without local&hukou&to take the college entrance examination locally by 2016 if they have attended local high schools and if their parents are legally registered temporary residents with over three years of social insurance payment to the provincial government. (Under current rules, students who hope to take the annual college entrance exam will have to do so in the province where their&hukou&belongs.)
The main worry of Chinese urban planning experts about delinking social benefits like subsidized education from&hukou&status is the intense pressure the new city population would create on urban infrastructure. In Beijing, for instance, local first grade students entering elementary schools will jump from the current 110,000 to around 180,000 in 2014, the government predicts. Accommodating more migrant students on top of this bulge of local students will be challenging, and it&s a problem that also exists in other metropolises like Shanghai or Shenzhen. Given such constraints, a more sustainable solution that would improve the education of left-behind children in the long run perhaps lies closer to home.
For years, the economic gap between coastal areas and inland provinces has been the primary driver for the mass migration of labor. Increasingly, however, migrant flows are starting to shift. The development of inland cities such as Chengdu, Xi&an, Zhengzhou, and Wuhan now allows millions of migrants to find jobs without leaving their provinces. Since 2011 in the populous province of Henan, more workers have found jobs within the province than outside. Typically located in large provincial cities, the relative proximity of their workplaces to their hometowns means more migrants will be able to bring their children with them, and the cities& less strained infrastructure will be more able to absorb them. All these inland cities have expanded local schools, and as a result are able to adopt more relaxed rules than Beijing, clearing the way for migrant children to enroll in the local education system.
China&s ambitious plans to upgrade its economic machine and increase urbanization will fail if it&s not prepared for its future citizens to abandon farms and mountain communities like Guang&an. As tens of millions of farmers become newly minted urban residents each year&a process that will continue for decades to come&the fundamental solution to the issue of left-behind children is to reform the&hukou&system, extend the central government&s commitment to health care and public education, and create more urban employment opportunities. Such measures are sorely needed for migrant workers to put down their roots in cities.
A gradual delinking of&hukou&status and social benefits is a good place to start, but the process will need to be carried further. According to Chinese government estimates, the cost of converting each migrant into an urban citizen, apart from long-term pension costs, stands at around 67,000 RMB ($10,860). Providing urban living for tens of millions of migrant children and their parents will lead to a colossal bill, more than most local governments can pay out of their own coffers. If China is serious about its urbanization project, the central government will have to demonstrate its willingness to bear this financial strain in the years ahead.&The children of migrant laborers will never be equal to their urban peers until they can to go to the same schools, take the same exams, live in the same cities, and dream of the same future.
《流动与留守之间》
作者：任星辉，传知行社会经济研究所研究员。目前主持传知行研究所在三峡工程上的研究，三峡工程研究门户网站www.sanxia2008.org的主编；同时也负责传知行&公民转型论坛&的日常事务。
注：本文是传知行研究所&教育平权&计划2011年年度报告《流动与留守之间》的第一章，即&引言&部分。报告全文下载：。
一、为什么是教育？
中华人民共和国公民有受教育的权利和义务。
&&《中华人民共和国宪法》&第四十六条第一款
&教育对现代人意味着什么？
我们暂且不论发展人的独立精神、自由思想等关涉其本质的理由，而仅从比较现实的层面来看。
一个没有受过教育的人，无法读写，个人世界基本限于耳闻目见。在一个以信息高速流通为特征的时代，即使在他生活的传统社区，这对他而言都是一种越来越明显的隔离&&读不懂村头的公告，看不明白一剂药的用法与用量，更写不出对远方亲人的牵挂；如果正好再做点小生意，凑巧大家又都习惯赊账，那么他只能依靠自己的记性、仰仗别人的良心；去信用社贷款，陪亲人去医院做手术，凡是需要写下自己名字，又没有熟人的地方，对他来说都是不小的考验&&
乡土之外的广阔世界，则近乎陷阱。他当然可以四处打问、观察和寻找，可越是远离故土，越是一口乡音难觅&知音&，老把式的经验越是不再灵光，世界越是邪了门的繁杂和难以琢磨。一份不用扛麻袋、下工地，只靠写写算算就能有收入的工作，亦遥不可及。
所有这些，对于一个受过基础教育的人而言，都是坦途。此外，如果他愿意，还可以继续在智识的阶梯上攀爬，他受的教育越好，他的攀爬也就越顺畅。而未受教育者或者粗制滥造教育的受害者，对此几乎只能望洋兴叹。
在个人生存的维系、生活理想的实现之外，教育对于社会的意义也毋庸置疑。无论银行的自动取款机还是车站的自动售票机，都是节约人力并方便人们生活的设备，但这些对于未受过教育的人来说，如果人工服务窗口因此取消或少得可怜，则是大麻烦&&售票尚可以求助他人，银行卡密码又怎么告诉别人？此外，好像这里每天都有村民被基层组织和政府利用信息不对称蒙骗，被雇主拖欠工资的事情发生，公共政策的不仁和公共治理的失序固然是这一切的根本原因，但如果他们都是受过良好教育的人，因此更知道如何寻求相应的公力救济或更有力的自力救济，那些行状还会像今天这么流行和狂妄吗？
更何况，在这些快低到尘埃里的琐碎和具体理由之外，还有更深层次的基于人的价值和尊严方面的因素。并且，如果我们让叙事的方式更宏大些，那么，梁启超先生110年前所说的&少年智则国智，少年富则国富；少年强则国强，少年独立则国独立；少年自由则国自由，少年进步则国进步&不是正好可以用在这里吗？一个在教育方面都尽不了本分，导致未来的国民要么未受教育、要么遭受着不合格教育的毒害的政府，其治下的国家，又怎么富强？
职是之故，受教育权在很多国家都被法律明确规定为国民的基本权利，提供一定年限的义务教育也成了这些国家的政府的义务。并且，由于义务教育的重要性，它也被看做一种应对当地所有适龄儿童提供的公共服务，而不受国籍、社会出身等因素的限制。关于前一点，在《宪法》及《教育法》、《义务教育法》等多部立法中规定了受教育权及义务教育的我国即适其例；后一点不但有《世界人权宣言》、《取缔教育歧视公约》、《经济、社会、文化权利国际公约》、《儿童权利公约》及《保护所有移徙工人及其家庭成员权利国际公约》等多个国际条约的规定，而且在一些国家得到实践，以美国为例，虽然受教育权并非宪法权利，但依然受到宪法修正案&平等保护&条款的保护&&联邦最高法院曾于1982年的&移民子女学费案&中，判决德克萨斯州对美国公民和合法外籍居民提供免费公共教育，却对未注册非法移民子女征收学费的做法违反&平等保护&条款。[1]
至于政府应否承担提供教育服务的职责以及应承担何种责任的问题，因学术流派的不同而看法各异。但从现实的角度，至少可以说：既然法律承诺了义务教育，那么政府就有义务办好公办学校，为每个适龄儿童提供合格的义务教育。与此同时，不应限制和歧视民办教育，以为有能力者提供更多样的选择&&但政府提供的教育得有起码的品质，不然一个&存心&把教育搞得那么坏，一个比政府更为人民服务，岂不摆明了合伙打劫？最后，如果政府提供的义务教育不合格或者索性无心提供义务教育，那么应该让它做的只有：退钱，让路。
二、为什么是农民工？
非农非工农民工，非驴非马洋人街。&&重庆洋人街非主题公园标语
有一群人，他们从这个国家开始正常化的时候起，不断离开故土，怀揣活命或者寻找另一种生活的理想，从全国各地的乡村旮旯里纷纷进入城市，然后在那里的工地和工厂，用超负荷的劳动和非常低的回报，为一座座崛起的新城添砖加瓦，为一条条连通你我的道路夯土筑基，更打拼出了一个国家的经济腾飞。
在三十年的时间里，他们把自己的力量融入了城市的亮丽和国家的神气，但每当年关将近，他们中的绝大多数又千里奔波，返回家乡，春节后，又挤在通往城市的车上。每一次回乡和返城，除了路费的花销，还有一票难求，苦苦等在车站时的不知所措，列车里水泄不通的煎熬以及风雪阻路车不前的焦灼。可他们依然像候鸟一样年复一年的在城市和家之间来回。
他们是农民，却离开土地，踏入城市，过着另一种生活。他们是工人，却永远是城市的外乡人和暂住客，不但工资比不得城市里的职工，而且没有各种保障和公共服务&&他们也是血肉之躯，也会在寒来暑往中染病，也会在岁月流逝中老去，可是医疗、养老保险之类，全和他们无关；他们也有正在成长、需要家庭温暖的儿女，可城市不欢迎他们，很多公办学校也把他们挡在大门之外。即使他们在城市劳作有年，携妻带子，生活有年，依然难洗掉他们的&农业户口&和农民身份&&除非有人看中他们的土地，需要他们&上楼&&&难为自己与城市孩子同在一片蓝天下的子女，赢得同样的入学机会。
这群家乡要&输出&他们来挣GDP，城市也在等着他们来创造GDP的人，被共同贴上了一个标签，叫做&农民工&。城市需要他们的劳动，却阻止他们在那里憩息和落地生根，他们除了眷恋故园，还有多少选择呢？他们的乡情也许太浓，可城市又何尝不是负义呢？
如果一个制度使人因为自己无法选择的出身而被打上烙印，而这个烙印不但无法通过自己的拼搏改变，而且还是许多公共政策据以对待他们和他们的子女的依据，那一定是这个制度出了问题。如果这样一个以出身为标准，使一部分人辛劳有加却无法同工同酬，在公共生活中被打入另册的野蛮制度还存在于今天，想必很多人不用细翻历史，都会感到恍若隔世&&早在两百多年前，人类先哲已经喊出了&人人在各国境内有权自由迁徙和居住&，喊出了&人人有同工同酬的权利，不受任何歧视&，并且明言一切基本权利和自由的享有不分&种族、肤色、性别、语言、宗教、政治或其他见解、国籍或社会出身、财产、出生或其他身份等任何区别&。
可是，正是当我们在教科书上放声歌唱前人的公义，并在自己的法律文本上写下&自由&、&权利&与&平等&的时候，这种最明目张胆的基于出身的歧视，在这片国土上四处招摇，使五分之一的国民由于它而不得不在自己贡献着和生活着的城市作为外乡人流浪。并且，他们的子女不但因为父母的身份而受到歧视，也正在继承着制度强加给父辈的不公和屈辱&&新生代农民工问题的出现，多少能说明这一点。
如此对待自己的国民，确实是一个奇迹，但它就是发生了。不管你信不信，它就发生在你我身边，也许还发生在&人户分离&的你我身上&&
正如黄钟先生所言，户口鸿沟不仅仅存在于城乡之间，照样存在于城镇与城镇之间，任何人，不分南北，只要你离开了户籍所在地，就面临这个问题。[2]只是因为我们有人或者因为不用背负&农民&的标签，或者因为有实力通过关系或票子搞定本就该有的待遇，因此意识不到自己的实际身份罢了。但正因如此，背负烙印，又没有那么神通广大的这些人，境遇才更值得我们关注&&
通过他们，我们能更清晰地认识到自己的真实身份，能更准确地检验这个国家的政策和执政者的品质。当然，我们更应该争取我们当得的平等对待，因为户籍控制之下，所有离开户籍地的人都是广义上的农民工。&&
三、为什么是平等？&
中华人民共和国公民在法律面前一律平等。
&&《中华人民共和国宪法》&第三十三条第二款
凡具有中华人民共和国国籍的适龄儿童、少年，不分性别、民族、种族、家庭财产状况、宗教信仰等，依法享有平等接受义务教育的权利，并履行接受义务教育的义务。
国务院和县级以上地方人民政府应当合理配置教育资源，促进义务教育均衡发展，改善薄弱学校的办学条件，并采取措施，保障农村地区、民族地区实施义务教育，保障家庭经济困难的和残疾的适龄儿童、少年接受义务教育。
父母或者其他法定监护人在非户籍所在地工作或者居住的适龄儿童、少年，在其父母或者其他法定监护人工作或者居住地接受义务教育的，当地人民政府应当为其提供平等接受义务教育的条件。具体办法由省、自治区、直辖市规定。
&&《中华人民共和国义务教育法》&第四条、第六条第一款、第十二条第二款&
关于教育，关于农民工，在前面零零碎碎讲了那么多，好像这是个得诉诸某些人的仁慈的问题，但现实看似如此并不等于该当如此。事实上，还有一杆叫做&平等&的标尺，在更高处度量着这一切，当下的法庭可以把它关在门外，但它依然在那里。而现实的疯狂，只能告诉我们这个国家的公共治理背离法治有多远。
回到我们的主题：公共教育，为什么必须对所有人平等开放？
在权利的分类上，一般认为受教育权是一种社会经济权利，在性质上属于积极权利和发展权。与传统权利，即消极权利和生存权不同，受教育权的这种属性意味着在没有相应的立法提供具体保障的情况下，政府无力提供公共教育或者提供的教育达不到一定的要求时，个体公民并不能诉诸司法救济。至于政府应为此担当的政治责任，在正常政治中则由民众用手中的选票去追究。而无论有无具体立法的保障，政府一旦开始提供教育，则必须对所有人一视同仁。
前述的种种学理推演，在中国都不应成为问题，因为我们在《宪法》之外，还有《教育法》、《义务教育法》、《高等教育法》等多部立法来落实受教育权。这就是说，政府在提供义务教育上有绝对义务，在高等教育上有提供法律平等保护的职责。
无论其权利属性如何，教育由政府提供，就意味着它是一种公共服务，因此就得以适当的标准作为提供与否以及如何提供的理由。义务教育是普及性的，其重点在于有需要和提供基本保障，因此应该面向所有适龄儿童，而不应该挑肥拣瘦，对一部分人开放而将另一部分人拒之门外，或为一部分人锦上添花而任由另一部分人青黄不接，尤其是以户籍这样的理由。
中国政府在义务教育上的失败在于，忽视义务教育的普及性，由政府代私立学校之劳，斥资在从乡镇到县城，从省会到首都的一切中心地带，打造各种层次的贵族学校，使我们的义务教育，山坳里由民办教师应付着，而城里学校则尽豪华之能事，乃至好好的装修、好好的设施，却不断扒了重来，只因为不差钱。与此同时，把教育当做一种特权，附加在一个叫做户籍的东西上。既然移居城市并不违法，这些移民的孩子作为受教育权的享有者为什么不能在父母工作地或经常居住地就近入学？另外，即使移居不受欢迎，惩罚应及于无辜的孩子吗？然而，现实就是这样荒谬：城市心安理得地享受着劳工移民带来的服务和税收，却拒绝保障其子女的受教育权，并且满心疑虑，总是担心他们是冲着城市的教育资源来的&&户籍制度在此处的威力是，不但外地人无由入读，而且户籍不在这类学校学区范围的本地人也不会比外地人更有份。
公共服务的提供固然有中央政府和地方政府在权属上的划分，但教育资源的分布如此不均，以至于每个中心地带的人都不惮以最坏的恶意来揣测他们之外的同胞，这对一个共同体来说，本就是最大的反讽。即使在联邦国家，也有财政均衡政策来为自己的国民，无分南北，不论贫富，在义务教育上提供一个基本均等的待遇。在集权的中国，长期以来，不但分配给农村地区的教育资源少的可怜，并且还阻止那些已经移居城市的人，让自己的子女在经常居住地接受合格的义务教育。而《义务教育法》明确规定，&国务院和县级以上地方人民政府应当合理配置教育资源，促进义务教育均衡发展&，儿童现居住地的&当地人民政府应当为其提供平等接受义务教育的条件&。
总而言之，无论是基于学理，还是根据现行法律，平等在义务教育阶段的意思，都是每个儿童有权在父母的工作地或经常居住地就近入学，无论他的父母是从事何种工作，来自何方。另外，教育资源的配置必须尽量均衡，政府应该为所有人接受义务教育提供基本均衡的底线保障，而非为一些人修建贵族学校。作为一项普及性的公共服务，义务教育非如此不可。
另外，在本应按成绩向人们开放的高等教育中，我国的做法又何尝符合平等保护的要求呢？长期以来，部属高校的入学通知基本被作为对一个个发达省份&经济社会发展情况&的奖赏，而非根据成绩这一才算合适的标准，来决定谁将获得更多机会。不过就此打住，这是我们未来会详细讨论的话题。
四、关于本报告
教育和农民问题都是传知行研究所长期关注的对象，但对这两个话题的交叉地带&&农民工子女义务教育&&进行系统的调查研究，却始于今年。
我们之所以选择农民工子女义务教育作为2011年传知行&教育平权&计划的研究对象，如前所述，是基于我们对教育的重要性及农民工这一群体遭受的制度性不公的认识。法律的平等保护则是我们审视此问题的视角。
于是，从年初开始，我们在&教育平权&计划中组织农民工子女义务教育问题双月讨论会，同时对北京、上海、深圳、合肥四地的城市农民工子女教育，以及河南、安徽两省部分农村地区的义务教育情况分别作了调研，并通过书面研究获取了国外义务教育的一些基本信息。在此基础上，我们撰写了本报告。
这份报告分作五部分：
第一章&&导言
第二章&&城市农民工子女义务教育情况
该部分主要介绍我们调研所得的北京、上海、深圳及合肥四个城市当前的农民工子女义务教育状况，会顺带提及部分城市的相关政策
第三章&&农村义务教育情况
如果随父母进入城市会在义务教育上面临多重问题，那么留守农村，对农民工子女而言又是一种什么样的选择呢？回答问题之前，我们先看看河南、安徽两省部分农村地区的义务教育情况
第四章&&农民工子女义务教育：问题及分析
基于前述调研，我们对当前的农民工子女义务教育问题在这里进行综合探讨
第五章&&国际义务教育概况
本部分介绍其他几个国家怎么看待义务教育，又是怎么做的。固然不必&言必称希腊&，但了解一点它们怎么对待自己土地上的儿童，对解决我们自己的问题没有坏处&&他山之石，可以攻玉
其中第一、四章由任星辉完成，第五章由杨子立完成，第二、三章中的河南、北京、上海调研由杨子立和任星辉共同进行，深圳调研由杨子立完成，安徽调研由任星辉完成，这两章的内容则由任星辉在各自所写的调研报告的基础上综合而成。
报告中经常用到或与本报告主题相关的一些名词，解释如下：
农民工&&指进入城镇或城市工作的&农业户口&人员。由于户籍制度，&农民&对他们而言，不是一种职业，而是一种被迫世袭的身份。他们虽然已经离开土地，不再是农民，却无法改变他们的&农民&身份。他们是中国当前流动人口的主要组成部分，在官方文件中亦被称作&进城务工人员&、&农村流动人口&等。
城市农民工子女&&指城镇或城市里的父母是&农业户口&的儿童，即通常所说的打工子弟，官方文件中也称作&农民工同住子女&、&进城务工人员随迁子女&、流动儿童等。但严格来说，打工子弟、尤其是流动儿童包括了所有离开父母户籍地的未成年人，因此范围大于城市农民工子女。
农民工子女学校&&是指未获办学许可的专门接收城市农民工子女的小学和初中，一般由私人创办，通常称为打工子弟学校，在官方文件也称为&自办学校&、&简易学校&。
民办学校&&是指根据《中华人民共和国民办教育促进法》，经教育行政部门审批，获得办学许可证的学校。有的该类学校也是政府出资支持，属公助民办或国有民办性质。该词在本报告中专指义务教育阶段的这类学校，比通常用法狭窄。
公办学校&&和民办学校相对，指由政府创办，由公共财政维持运作的享受事业单位待遇的学校。在本报告中限定为义务教育阶段的中、小学。
生均公用经费&&指由政府按在校生学生数量向学校拨付的维持其日常运行的经费，其开支范围包括业务费、公务费、设备购置费、修缮费和其他属于公用性质的费用等，但不包括人员经费和基建投资等方面的开支。在本报告中简称生均经费。[3]
特岗教师&&是指为补充和改善欠发达地区农村学校的师资状况，按一定要求和程序，从大学毕业生中选聘到县以下农村中小学任职的教师。聘期3年。所需资金由中央和地方共同负担，以中央为主；期满后考核合格者，可按事业编制留任当地学校，财政支持亦转归地方政府。
&两免一补&&&指在农村义务教育阶段，免除教科书费和学杂费及补助寄宿生生活费。该政策最初只有农村家庭困难学生享有，现已覆盖农村全部学生。目前部分城市在义务教育阶段也实现了&两免&，还有部分城市只免学杂费。
&两为主&政策&&具体指&以流入地政府管理为主，以全日制公办中小学为主&解决农民工子女义务教育问题的规定。该政策明文规定于2001年国务院颁布的《关于基础教育改革和发展的决定》中。
撤点并校&&指在农村地区撤销部分教学点和村小，将已有资源合并到规模较大的学校或乡镇学校，集中办学。该做法1990年代末时已经存在，在2001年《国务院关于基础教育改革与发展的决定》之后的农村教育格局调整中被大力推行。[4]
当然，上面的&农民工&、&流动人口&等说法，如黄钟先生所言，充满歧视意味，应该避免使用；问题的关键是移民子女教育问题，农民工问题仅是表现之一，且具有遮掩问题本质的话语欺骗性。虽然我们在本报告的多处指出了这一点，但为了让大家更直观地了解最突出的问题，也为了表达上的方便，还是保留了习惯的说法。虽然我们无心冒犯，还是在这里表达我们的歉意，希望得到谅解。我们会在以后弥补这个缺憾。
黄钟先生、郭宇宽博士、卫宏先生、袁连生教授、杨东平教授、丁延庆副教授、张志强先生及韩嘉玲研究员等应邀出席我们组织的历次讨论会，与我们分享了各自的研究成果和见解，我们受教匪浅，特此致谢：
黄钟、郭宇宽、卫宏：
农民工子女义务教育平等保障问题&&日
农民工子女义务教育经费问题&&日
农民工子女义务教育现状分析&&日
北京打工子弟学校的成长和现况&&日
中西部农村义务教育状况&&&日
当前流动儿童教育问题&&日
郭宇宽博士又在今年的几次农村调研中，为我们提供了大量帮助，黄钟先生则多次提醒我们注意农民工问题的本质是新移民问题，再次感谢。
由于我们从事这项研究的时日尚短，难免疏浅乃至错漏，望读者诸君不吝指正，以期我们在未来的研究中补正和改进。
对本报告及传知行&教育平权&计划的批评和建议请和任星辉联系：。
[1]&详见张千帆：《美国联邦宪法》，法律出版社2011年，第331-334页。
[2]&黄钟先生3月27日在传知行&关于农民工子女平等教育权保障问题研讨会&上的发言，整理稿&移民难题在撕裂中国社会&载《传知行学术通讯》2011年第3期。
[3]&参见财教[2001]38号文件。
[4]&参见&共和国辞典：撤点并校&，。
[Mapping Project] 一起点亮百所打工子弟学校-- 205万打工子女没有接受义务教育
目前全国有205万打工子女，其中8.5万就读于北京117所打工子弟学校。这些孩子没有享受到义务教育。活动包括三个环节：拍照、点亮打工子弟学校地图、写下学校名字。拍照，使活动现场更多人了解205万这个数字背后的意义；点亮打工子弟学校地图，通过 亲身参与，对打工子弟学校的分布有更加直观、深刻的感受；写下学校名字及学生人数，通过就读于打工子弟学校的学生人数的累加，让公众感受到没有接受义务教育的打工子女的数量之多及问题的重要性。
4月29日，新公民计划在郎园艺术中心开展了“改变始于关注”系列活动之——一起点亮百所打工子弟学校的活动（一），活动历经两个小时，117所打工子弟学校被全部“点亮”。此次活动吸引了上百人参与，有白领，鼓手，学生，小孩，家长，有人说：教育的壁垒不仅应在网络的平台上打破与开放，更应努力在现实生活中均匀教育资源。孩子，尤其是打工人群子弟的流动性与对教育资源的渴望，不应被户籍、体制等因素限制。希望未来十年所有的适龄儿童在共通、绿色的教育环境中快乐成长。
在右侧的背板上孩子们写下学校的名字及学生人数
参与者拿到一张明信片，写有一所学校的名字，学生人数及学校地址
关注：新浪微博@新公民学校
邮箱：xingongmin@
电话：010—
野蛮生长的“ 农民工二代”－中国的“美国梦”代价
有一本畅销书叫《野蛮生长》，作者带有一丝自豪的口吻介绍民营企业在改革开放中的混乱规则中拳打脚踢的故事，吸引了很多的眼球。而在我们身边，有一个巨大的群体，在他们的状态，用野蛮成长来描述，几乎是最贴切的,而另一方面他们在目前可以看得见的前途,并不光明。&
今天的中国有些类似美国的&镀金时代&，那是19世纪下半叶，随着内战结束和南方重建展开，美国进入经济高速发展的重要历史阶段。这一时期，美国工业发展迅猛，科技水平不断提高，城市化进入高潮。以制造业的兴起为主要导向，来自爱尔兰、意大利、中国的移民为美国工农业、矿业和交通运输业提供了源源不断的廉价劳动力，他们的奋斗和血泪也成为今天&美国梦&的一部分。
随着1978年中国结束文革，走上改革开放，产生大量的农村富余劳动力向城市转移的现象，他们中的一部分因为失去了土地，或者城市给以他们更多的吸引，较为稳定地在城市寻找发展和就业机会。其中有些人进入城市时把孩子留在了农村，这就是&留守儿童&，而另一些人把孩子也带到了城市,这些孩子就成了&城市新移民&第二代。而和绝大多数国家不一样的是，中国作为历史遗留问题的户籍制度依旧存在，以国家权力对其所辖范围内的户口进行调查、登记、申报，并按一定的原则进行立户、分类、划等和编制。49年之后户籍制度的从总体上看，仍保留有大量传统的统治色彩。如户籍带有深深的身份烙印，城市户口和农村户口之间存在着等级差异性，享受的待遇明显不同；户籍被打上世袭的烙印，农村居民的子弟除考学等少数途径外，绝大部分都承袭父母的农村户籍。这就意味着这些随同父母来到城市的孩子无法和有城市户籍的儿童享受同样的教育资源和机会，而这个群体的人数是不可忽略的。日，巴黎东北郊克利希苏布瓦镇的两名少年在躲避警察追赶时触电身亡。愤怒的当地青年开始纵火发泄不满，骚乱在一周内，迅速蔓延到巴黎周边十多个 城镇。人们普遍把骚乱归结到两个原因。其一是法国大城市与周边郊区贫富、治安、就业上的强烈落差；其二是法国一直以来寻求的种族、民族、文化同化政策反而加深了对立。这次发生骚乱的巴黎周边地区主要聚居着非洲与阿拉伯人移民。他们大多居住在上个世纪六七十年代建造的房子里。法国政府当年为缓和巴黎城区住房压力，在郊区及周边省份集中兴建了大批住宅楼。高人口密度，移民众多，高失业率，使这些地区逐渐成为贫困、犯罪、吸毒、被遗忘者与被损害者的代名词。尤其在政府提供的公共住宅区，15岁至25岁青年人的失业率甚至高达40％。这次法国发生骚乱的主要是第二代移民,而中国的移民第二代,现在大多数还没有成年,他们在成长中,享受到的公平机会和教育、住房、医疗等方面的社会福利，远远逊色于法国的海外移民。有些人批评法国政府，给移民提供的公共住宅区，使他们不能与本地居民很好的融合。而中国政府则从来没有给来到城市的移民提供过任何形式的住房福利，他们大都住在卫生条件和公共设施极为缺乏，类似棚户区的&城中村&里。能否面对这样一个问题？我们的社会被掩盖着远比法国严峻，而像定时炸弹一样迟早要爆发的潜在矛盾。在本文中把研究对象定义为城市新移民第二代，这比称作&打工子弟&更为准确，因为在调查中发现，这些孩子的父母中独立开创商业和经营的也有相当比例，并不是传统意义上季节性&打工者&，同时他们又不同于那些在外企或事业单位等工作而进入北京和上海的白领，这个群体集中的随同父母来到大城市生活，是近年表现突出的现象，所以称作城市新移民第二代较为贴切。文中也使用 &打工子弟学校&这一早已约定俗成的提法。而在社会上依然普遍使用带有歧视含义的&农民工&这个标签。有识之士提出过一些假设：这些城市新移民第二代的大部分不会像他们的父辈一样甘愿回到家乡，也不会再适应农业劳作；他们因为从小就和城市户籍的孩子一样在城市生活，会比他们的父辈有更强烈的公平诉求；他们成长中会面临身份定位的困惑，他们对于环境敏锐的感知，会影响他们的价值观和对社会的态度。在马加爵案中&&一个淳朴勤奋的农村孩子，在大学里因为受到同学的歧视而激情犯罪。虽然是一个个案，但更应引起人们的警醒，长期的被歧视感、被边缘化的挫折感，也许会以让人痛心的方式爆发。美国社会学家帕克曾指出边缘化群体的特点：&他们寄托在两个不同的群体当中，但又不完全属于任何一方，他们的自我概念时矛盾的，不协调的。其生存状态呈现出既有希望也常也失望，既继续选择又别无选择，既要为适应新环境而进行冒险，又要为承受传统而付出忍耐，痛苦与憧憬并存，颓废与发奋共在。&接下来，从2009年初开始，以郭宇宽为发起人，开始策划这样一项颇具有挑战性的课题，用实证主义的方法，试图对这个群体中正处于成长期的孩子中，抽取一定的数量，进行至少5年的跟踪调查。之所以必须要有相当的数量，是因为这样才能有代表性和说服力，之所以这项调查必须进行至少5年以上，因为这才是一个在城市生活的打工自己较为完整的成长周期，也是性格塑造期。每一年的调查具体问题都会随着这些孩子的成长有所调整。但总体围绕的问题指向是：他们的物质和文化成长环境会怎样的影响和塑造他们的性格？使他们有怎样的人生目标？又会走怎样的人生道路？这些城市新移民第二代的孩子和同年龄的城市儿童和&留守儿童&相比，会不会表现出具有普遍性的性格特征？而这些特征又和哪些经历具有怎样的相关性？背后的逻辑是什么？2009年，初步选择了北京和上海两地，作为调查对象，因为这两个超级城市，都有&国际化大都市&之名，同时其户籍制度也最为坚固，其户籍居民在福利，尤其是教育机会方面更是具有特权性质，比如在高考中北京和上海户籍的考生被全国同龄人所羡慕。而这两个城市也都有大量的城市新移民第二代。研究的计划是在北京和上海两地选取各约10所打工子弟学校的共500名年龄在10岁左右的学童，进行至少5年的跟踪调查。在北京和上海尽可能抽取分布在不同区县的学校，调查样本的选取是进入一个打工子弟学校后，在三，四，五年级为主的班级中，在得到班主任的支持下，利用课外时间，随机抽取在10岁左右的同学进行调查。的因为两地团队认真负责的态度，并作了如何赢得信任的事先培训，剔除有重大遗漏和误会的错误样本,最后获得共998份有效样本，拒访率为零。这份调查的结果对于我们理解新移民第二代的成长状态，是有说服力。&橱窗&背后的孩子们北京是中国的&首善之区&，上海是中国的&国际金融中心&，这两个都是被当作中国&橱窗&来打造的城市，从两地的机场，开往市区，你看到的都是整洁的绿化，宽阔的道路，摩天大楼和现代的房屋，绝不会有类似印度&贫民窟&的景象。在奥运会、世博会这样的国际盛会中，展现的北京上海儿童，都是像花朵一样绽放，会弹钢琴，会说外语。而我们关注的&橱窗&背后的孩子们，确有着不一样的童年。在未来的研究中准备加入北京上海具有当地户籍的儿童的调查，作为比较组，而这次对于北京上海新移民第二代的孩子的调查，已经体现出一些值得关注的问题。比如北京上海的城市新移民第二代,独身子女比例都较低,只有约五分之一，而且父母有三个甚至四个孩子的也有相当比例，可以管窥，中国计划生育政策在流动人口中的实际效果。同时北京和上海的移民家庭在父母就业方面有很大的差别，这体现了两地产业结构的差别，我们在后面会发现父母的职业和孩子的志愿甚至性格发展都会有一定的关联性。北京的移民第二代孩的父亲比较集中的职业是个体零售及手工业34.67%和废品回收13.23%,这两个类别上海只有15.26%和1.2%,但同时上海从事运输行业和在工厂务工的比例则是18.27%和16.06%远远高于北京的7.41%和1.6%。北京的移民孩子中，父亲打散工1.6%，没有工作1.8%，不知道父亲平时干什么的占2%。而上海打散工2.01%，没有工作的2.41%，不知道的4.02%。这些父亲收入不稳定的家庭的孩子，将是我们未来需要重点关注的。在母亲的工作方面，在上海26.31%是工厂工人，北京只有2.64%。而北京上海统计中母亲完全没有工作的比例惊人地都是19.68%。家庭居住面积方面，上海的统计较为准确和细致和家长做了沟通，获取的数据有参考价值。平均家庭住房面积是40平米，而中位数是30平米，最小的都在10平米以内，考虑到这些家庭普遍有两个或以上的孩子，甚至其他的亲戚住在一起，这样的面积是比较狭小的。搬家是影响城市新移民子弟生活质量的一个重要因素，也会对其受教育条件和生活质量构成重要影响。北京和上海都有超过半数的孩子，在最近两年之内搬过家，50.7%，上海51.4%，有相当的家庭搬过两次三次的家。搬家的原因，其中有一个非常突出的原因，尤其在北京，就是因为拆迁占41.9%，在上海也占到了20.3%。这和城市新移民大量的集中居住在城乡结合部，受到快速城市化推进的影响和中国体制下的强制拆迁有关，这对于这些孩子成长中的安定感、安全感会有很大影响，值得在为来的跟踪研究中关注。在上海的的搬家原因中父母换工作是一个比较重要的项，占15.9%，而北京只有3.2%，这主要是因为在上海，如前所述，有较多在工厂工作的比例，而非技术性的工作岗位，就业较不稳定。从小学开始转学次数方面，在上海的新移民第二代孩子转学次数比例明显低于北京。上海的孩子没有转学或者只转学一次的孩子比例高于北京，而北京的孩子转学两次、三次甚至四五次的比例都高于上海，这可以视为，上海的新移民第二代孩子享受的受教育机会比北京更加稳定。和城市的孩子有明显区别的是，做家务的情况，两地较为一致，北京和上海的移民孩子，都有百分之八十以上需要在家做家务。统计平均一天一个孩子需要做约38分钟的家务，有个别家庭孩子会做两个小时以上的家务，才十岁的孩子，这在城市家庭是很难想象得，这样的家庭需要在未来的跟踪中重点关心。这些移民第二代的孩子，也许因为上学的不方便，普遍早起，我们的调查集中在月份，在上海有相当的孩子在5：30以前起床，18.6%，这也许与父母要去工厂上班的作息有关，或者因为上海天亮比北京早，还有待进一步研究。但可以确信的是，这些这些移民第二代的孩子普遍生存状态非常的艰辛，而且在经常化的拆迁和转学这样不安定的环境下成长，也较少能体会到独生子女家庭那种被宠爱的感觉。&富二代&、&官二代&到&农民工第二代&现在有很多关于&富二代&和&官二代&的讨论，传递着一个信息，就是社会阶层的再生产被固化，甚至有人怀疑中国存在着某种&精英联盟&，垄断了社会上发展和上升的通道。可以确信的是，在有关系传统的中国社会，一个孩子的家庭有什么&关系&，无疑会影响到他的发展机遇和选择空间。所以我们的调查重点之一就是搞清楚，北京上海的孩子，成长环境中的社会关系网络情况。城市新移民群体在选择移民城市时还是表现出很强的地域性。在统计北京上海的这些孩子出生地分布时,比例非常相近,都有一个最突出的省份。在北京的孩子，最集中的出生于河南（41.6%），河北（12%），而上海的孩子则最集中的是安徽（40.76%）和河南(14.46%)。这些孩子传统意义上的籍贯和自己的出生地往往并不一致。在我们的调查样本中，北京和上海都有大约百分之十的新移民第二代孩子，就出生在北京（10%）和上海（10.64%）。尽管如此，这些孩子中的绝大部分，并没有把自己看做北京人和上海人，他们的身份认同依然和籍贯地联系在一起。而且这些家庭来到北京和上海发展，通常有很强的乡缘、血缘色彩，往往一个家庭会和一些亲友选择在同一个城市的，相对接近的区域和行业生活工作。在我们的统计中，北京的孩子63.14%每周与同城市的其他亲属见几次面，而上海的孩每周与61.96%。这从侧面体现城市新移民群体的特点，有很强的亲属聚居性，可以想象一个地方的往往是被同乡亲友介绍到城市来寻求发展机会，而他们自然也居住在相对较近的区域，所以这些孩子每周可以这么高的频率见到同城市的亲属。在这样一个社区圈子中生活，也是新移民第二代成长环境的一个重要特征。这个乡缘、血缘色彩的圈子，也很大程度上决定了这些孩子们在成长中的社交圈。我们的调查还要求这些孩子列出最亲近的三个朋友的籍贯时，北京和上海的移民孩子都有相当高的比例最好的朋友和自己是相同的籍贯，这并不是一个令人感到轻松地现象.朋友甲籍贯与父亲籍贯的相关性，北京和上海均较高，而上海比北京更高，这意味着在上海的孩子的社交圈子，比北京还更强调地域性。总体而言,也就是说河南人的孩子还是和河南人的孩子交朋友，安徽人的孩子还是和安徽人的孩子交朋友。这也说明他们的生活和成长环境显然没有融入北京、上海这样的都市。在涉及这些新移民第二代孩子的社会认同时，我们设计了一个问题&你如果向别人介绍自己，会说自己是哪里人？&在北京几乎所有的新移民孩子都会说自己跟随父母的原籍身份，即使他或者她是在北京出身。而在上海有17.27%的孩子认为他或者她就是&上海人&，而6.43%有身份困惑。这里有两条需要在未来验证的假设，第一，上海比北京更加包容，对于移民来说更加易于融入。第二，则恰恰相反，说明北京比上海更加具有文化多样性，在北京把自己归为一个河北人或者河南人，并不会因此而感到压力，也不会产生迫切地想要被当做&北京人&看待的积极性。尤其是对于富于想象力的孩子来说，也许很难分辨&想成为北京（上海人）&和&是北京（上海人）&的区别。这两个完全南辕北辙的假设，需要在下面继续验。在重点调查了上海的移民孩子，认为怎么样才能算是上海人？有趣的是，相当多认为自己不是上海人的孩子&&31.1%把不懂上海话视为成为上海人的主要障碍。而相当多认为自己是上海人的孩子，提出的主要理由&&47.7%认为，自己在上海生活所以是上海人。
梦想照进未来在问到这些孩子未来选择在农村或是城市生活时？北京和上海的移民第二代