他們都在橋上等待約書亞 - 讀家書評 - 誠品站 Eslite Station
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他們都在橋上等待約書亞
&文/王健壯（中國時報前社長）&
　　一九六五年三月七日，阿拉巴馬州艾德蒙?佩特斯橋(Edmund Pettus Bridge)上發生「血腥星期天」(Bloody Sunday)事件那天，歐巴馬還未滿四歲，人在萬里之外的火奴魯魯。&
　　一九六八年四月四日，金恩博士在田納西州孟斐斯一家旅館陽台上被人槍殺那天，七歲的歐巴馬跟他的白人母親已移居印尼的雅加達。&
　　在美國漫長的黑人民權運動史上，血腥星期天與金恩被刺這兩個日子，都是改變歷史的關鍵轉折點；在血腥星期天事件發生四十三年後，金恩被刺四十年後，四十七歲的歐巴馬以「約書亞世代」自稱，終於完成了金恩那輩「摩西世代」的未竟志業：黑人，或者應該政治正確的說，非洲裔美國人，不僅跨過了佩特斯橋，也首次以合眾國領導人的身分走進了當初由奴隸興建的那座白宮。&
　　一九六五年的佩特斯橋之於黑人，就如同一八九０年的傷膝澗(Wounded Knee)之於印第安人一樣，都是種族受難的歷史遺址，也都是種族歷史充滿血淚的文學性隱喻。當時年僅二十五歲率領六百多位黑人走上佩特斯橋的路易斯(John Lewis)，雖然曾被鎮暴警察擊碎頭蓋骨差點喪命，但二００九年一月二十日，歐巴馬宣誓就職入主白宮當天，現任聯邦眾議員的路易士卻興奮得一再重覆：「巴拉克終於帶領我們跨過了那座橋」；四十多年才從橋頭走到橋尾，這條路何其漫漫，何其迢遠，又何其坎坷。&
　　但究竟該怎麼敘述這座既是現實又是隱喻的橋的故事呢？就從一八五二那年說起吧：史托威夫人(Harriet Stowe)寫的《黑奴籲天錄》(Uncle Tom&s Cabin)，雖然當年在美國大賣三十萬本，在英國更暢銷百萬本，按理說湯姆大叔的故事應該眾所皆知，也應眾有同感，但五年後(一八五七年)美國最高法院九位大法官在〈史考特訴桑福特案〉(Scott v.Sandford)的判決中，卻仍然以七比二的票數裁決黑奴不是美國公民，而是屬於白人的財產；命運悲慘的史考特仍然擺脫不掉湯姆大叔的奴隸宿命。&
　　最高法院這項被後代史家形容為憲政史上最可恥印記的判決，最後引發的是一場長達五年(一八六一到一八六五年)的血腥內戰，以六十多萬人死亡的代價，才在戰後當年換來了憲法第十三條修正案：「在合眾國管轄的任何地方，都不得存在奴隸制度」，以及一八六八年的憲法第十四條修正案：「所有在合眾國出生或歸化的人，都是合眾國的公民」，與一八七０年保障黑人選舉權的憲法第十五條修正案；聯邦國會通過的這三項憲法修正案，等於徹底推翻了最高法院〈史考特案〉的判決，似乎也洗刷了美國憲政史的恥辱印記。&
　　黑人雖然在憲法文獻中，從白人的財產變為自由人，也變為擁有權利的合法公民，但在現實社會中，這些身分的轉換卻祇維持了極為短暫的時間就又變回原樣。「重建時期」(一八六六到一八七七年)結束，聯邦軍隊從南方各州撤軍後，白人種族主義殘存的餘火又在南方各地熊熊燃起，所謂的《吉姆克勞法案》(Jim Crow Act)幾乎無州無之，各式各樣歧視黑人的法律建構出比〈史考特案〉更虛偽的「隔離但平等」(separate but equal)的制度。
&而且，不但州的單行法律凌駕了聯邦的憲法修正案，甚至聯邦最高法院也在一八九六年的〈普利西訴佛古森案〉(Plessy v.Ferguson)中，判決路易斯安那等州通過在公共車輛上隔離白人與黑人的法律並不違憲；自此以後，將近有六十多年的時間，only for white(僅限白人)的標誌牌，多到就像參差錯列的交通號誌牌一樣，在餐廳、學校、車站、劇院、圖書館與住宅區隨處可見，種族歧視不但合憲化、合法化，而且公開化；可見隔離是真，平等卻假。&
　　直到一九五四年，堪薩斯州一個小鎮裡名叫布朗(Oliver Brown)的黑人牧師，才讓歷史又出現了一次轉折。他因為女兒不能進白人學校就讀，一狀告進法院控訴鎮公所教育委員會違憲，但地方法院卻判決他敗訴，布朗不服，一路打到聯邦最高法院，這場改變歷史的訴訟(Brown v.Board of Education of Topeka)，在日後成為大法官的知名黑人民權律師馬歇爾(Thurgood Marshall)的雄辯之下，以及以開明進步著稱的首席大法官華倫(Earl Warren)的強力主導之下，九位大法官最後全數同意判決學校的隔離制度違憲；反對隔離的人以「這一天將留名青史」來形容這項判決，擁護隔離的人卻稱這一天是「黑色的星期一」。&
　　但歷史的腳步卻總是進一步又退兩步。〈布朗案〉判決後隔年(一九五五年)十二月一日，阿拉巴馬州蒙哥馬利市一位在紡織廠工作的四十二歲女工帕克絲(Rosa Parks)，因為在公車上拒絕讓座給白人而被警察逮捕，可見〈布朗案〉的憲法規範效應仍然不及於公車；民權運動組織於是決定發動大罷乘運動，抵制當地的巴士公司，領導這場長達三百八十一天運動的人就是金恩博士，當年他才二十六歲，這是他在民權運動展露頭角的開始，帕克絲也因為這場運動而被人稱譽為「民權第一夫人」。&
　　蒙哥馬利大罷乘運動是民權運動的一個新起點，從此以後堂堂溪水出前村，從此以後大江東流擋不住。一九六０年，洶湧江水沖進北卡羅萊納州，民權組織發動大規模「入座運動」，抵制餐廳拒絕黑人進入用餐，並且無懼警察逮捕，揚言「讓我們把監獄填滿」；一九六三年八月二十八日，滔滔江水再沖向首都，二十五萬人進軍華府，他們呼喊禁止種族歧視的聲音響徹雲霄，金恩那篇「我有一個夢」的演說至今仍在林肯紀念堂內迴響不停。&
　　再接下來的故事就是發生在佩特斯橋上的血腥星期天事件，江水又沖回到阿拉巴馬州，沖向距離蒙哥馬利大約四十英里外一個名叫塞爾瑪(Selma)的小鎮。&
　　塞爾瑪居民半數以上是黑人，但其中卻祇有百分之一的黑人擁有投票權，其他人的投票權都被白人所制定的「投票稅」、「識字測驗」等惡法惡規所剝奪。而且，阿拉巴馬州不但是「深南」各州執行《吉姆克勞法》最多也最徹底的一個州，州長華勒斯(George Wallace)更是隔離政策的強硬派，公開揚言「現在隔離，明天隔離，永遠隔離」。&
　　血腥星期天事件之所以發生，就是因為民權組織抗爭投票權而起。當天遠在華府白宮內觀看電視播報佩特斯橋上警察暴行的詹森總統，氣得用髒話大罵華勒斯，五天後他更把華勒斯叫進白宮，在橢圓形辦公室內與他討論(爭論也許更準確)塞爾瑪鎮的情勢，詹森要求華勒斯同意民權組織從塞爾瑪遊行到蒙哥馬利，並且要他保證不以暴力威脅他們的安全，否則聯邦政府將強力介入。&
　　兩天後，一九六五年三月十五日，血腥星期天過了一週後，詹森在國會山莊向參眾兩院議員發表一篇名為「美國承諾」的演說，承諾賦與每位公民不受歧視的投票權利；演說後兩天，詹森又火速把《投票權法案》送進參眾兩院，參院在五月二十六日通過，眾院也在七月九日通過，八月六日，詹森在白宮簽署這項法案時，金恩與帕克絲等民權領袖都應邀在現場做歷史見證。&
　　佩特斯橋上的血腥星期天，可以說是詹森加速制定《投票權法案》的催化劑；其實在華勒斯與詹森白宮會談後六天，金恩即已率領三千多位民眾，在警察全副武裝環伺下平安跨過了佩特斯橋，他們每天行進十二英里，夜宿路邊荒野，四天後抵達蒙哥馬利時，隊伍人數已增加到兩萬五千多人；這是民權運動的一次大勝利。&
　　一九六０年代是民權運動風起雲湧的年代，也是民權相關法案制定最具進步意義的年代。一九六四年由甘迺迪發動、詹森接續完成立法的《民權法案》以及《投票權法案》，都是以聯邦的憲政權力推翻了各州殘存的各項《吉姆克勞法》，也遙相呼應並以法律形式實踐了將近一百年前的十三、十四與十五條的憲法修正案。但誰也不曾料到，就在民權運動開花結果的豐收時刻，孟斐斯的一聲槍響卻奪走了領導民權運動的那位摩西的生命；那一年，金恩才三十九歲。&
　　歐巴馬三十九歲那年，西元二０００年，他正二連任伊利諾州參議員，並且在聯邦眾議員民主黨內初選時，以將近一倍的票數敗給四連任的資深眾議員羅許(Bobby Rush)，這是他一生的第一場敗仗；但誰也不曾料到短短八年後，四十七歲的歐巴馬卻意外完成了摩西不曾預料會這麼早就能夠實現的那個夢想：約書亞終於帶領他的追隨者抵達了應許之地。&
　　但在變成約書亞之前，歐巴馬長達三十多年的奧德賽，其實是一趟尋求身分尋求認同的漫長旅程。雷姆尼克以「種族就是歐巴馬故事的核心」來總結歐巴馬的，就代表要瞭解歐巴馬，就必須把他放進民權運動史的脈絡中，在這樣的脈絡中去尋找他每一處落腳的蹤跡，去玩味他每一句跟摩西的跨世代對話，以及去感覺他在滔滔雄辯中那個隱而不顯但卻始終不斷此起彼落有關種族的主旋律。&
　　也正因為如此，在我們走向雷姆尼克以文字搭建的那座佩特斯橋之前，更必須要頻頻回首去呼喚摩西世代那些人的名字，去傳述那些人的故事，以及去聆聽那些人的召喚，尤其是歐巴馬最愛的那句金恩名言：「道德蒼穹的弧線僅管很長，但它彎向正義的一方」。&
　　正義在蒼穹的那一邊，也在橋的另一端，帕克絲、金恩以及許許多多以血淚書寫民權歷史的那些老靈魂，都佇立在橋上等待約書亞，等待一代又一代的約書亞。&Ch15 Flashcards -
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58 Cards in this Set
Wilmore proviso
A bill that proposed to ban slavery in many territories
Free-soil party
A political party dedicated to stopping the expansion to slavery
Henrey clay
Us senator from Kentucky who proposed the compromise of 1850
Stephen A douglas
Us senator from illinois who worked to pass the compromise of 1850
The compromise of 1850
Effort by congress to settle the issue
Of slavery in the territories that arose when California was admitted as a free state
Harriet beecher stowe
Author of the antislavery novel
Unle toms cabin
Uncle toms cabin
Antislavery novel written by harriet stowe
Fugitive slave act
Law that helpedslaveholders recapture runaway slaves
Popular sovereignty
A system where residents vote to decide an issue
Kansas-nebraska act
Law that split the Nebraska territory into kansas and nebraska and allowed people to vote on slavery in these territories
John brown
An extreme abolitionist
Republic party
Antislavery political party that formed in the 1850s
John c fremont
Republic party candidate in the 1856s presidential election
James buchanan
15th president
Dred Scott v sandford
Court case that extended the rights of rights of slaveholders and limited legal efforts to challenge slavery
Roger b toney
Chef justice of the supreme court, who wrote the lead opinion in the dred Scott case
Abraham Lincoln
Illinios republican candidate for the us senate
Harpers ferry
Location of us arsenal in virginia, which was raided by John brown
Republic party
Antislavery political party that formed in the 1850s
John c fremont
Republic party candidate in the 1856s presidential election
James buchanan
15th president
Dred Scott v sandford
Court case that extended the rights of rights of slaveholders and limited legal efforts to challenge slavery
Roger b toney
Chef justice of the supreme court, who wrote the lead opinion in the dred Scott case
Abraham Lincoln
Illinios republican candidate for the us senate
Harpers ferry
Location of us arsenal in virginia, which was raided by John brown
Republic party
Antislavery political party that formed in the 1850s
John c fremont
Republic party candidate in the 1856s presidential election
James buchanan
15th president
Dred Scott v sandford
Court case that extended the rights of rights of slaveholders and limited legal efforts to challenge slavery
Roger b toney
Chef justice of the supreme court, who wrote the lead opinion in the dred Scott case
Abraham Lincoln
Illinios republican candidate for the us senate
Harpers ferry
Location of us arsenal in virginia, which was raided by John brown
Republic party
Antislavery political party that formed in the 1850s
John c fremont
Republic party candidate in the 1856s presidential election
James buchanan
15th president
Dred Scott v sandford
Court case that extended the rights of rights of slaveholders and limited legal efforts to challenge slavery
Roger b toney
Chef justice of the supreme court, who wrote the lead opinion in the dred Scott case
Abraham Lincoln
Illinios republican candidate for the us senate
Harpers ferry
Location of us arsenal in virginia, which was raided by John brown
Republic party
Antislavery political party that formed in the 1850s
John c fremont
Republic party candidate in the 1856s presidential election
James buchanan
15th president
Republic party
Antislavery political party that formed in the 1850s
Dred Scott v sandford
Court case that extended the rights of rights of slaveholders and limited legal efforts to challenge slavery
John c fremont
Republic party candidate in the 1856s presidential election
Roger b toney
Chef justice of the supreme court, who wrote the lead opinion in the dred Scott case
James buchanan
15th president
Abraham Lincoln
Illinios republican candidate for the us senate
Dred Scott v sandford
Court case that extended the rights of rights of slaveholders and limited legal efforts to challenge slavery
Harpers ferry
Location of us arsenal in virginia, which was raided by John brown
Roger b toney
Chef justice of the supreme court, who wrote the lead opinion in the dred Scott case
Abraham Lincoln
Illinios republican candidate for the us senate
Harpers ferry
Location of us arsenal in virginia, which was raided by John brown
A statement of beliefs
To formally withdraw from the union
Confederate states of America
Confederation formed by the seceded southern states
Jefferson Davis
President of the confederacy
Crittenden plan
Compromise plan to prevent secession
Ready To Get Started?Dred Scott v. Sandford | Teaching American History
& Dred Scott v. Sandford
Dred Scott v. Sandford
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. …
The question is simply this: can a negro whose ancestors were imported into this country and sold as slaves become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen, one of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution?
It will be observed that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country and sold and held as slaves. The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State in the sense in which the word “citizen” is used in the Constitution of the United States. And this being the only matter in dispute on the pleadings, the court must be understood as speaking in this opinion of that class only, that is, of those persons who are the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves. …
The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the “sovereign people,” and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or lawmaking power, to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the court is to interpret the instrument they have framed with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted. …
The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, at that time in this country[,] or who might afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be made free in any State, and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of the United States and endue him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent? Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts?
The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts.
It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons who were, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, recognised as citizens in the several States became also citizens of this new political body, it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. And the personal rights and privileges guarantied to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise become members according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded. It was the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate political communities into one political family, whose power, for certain specified purposes, was to extend over the whole territory of the United States. And it gave to each citizen rights and privileges outside of his State which he did not before possess, and placed him in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of person an it made him a citizen of the United States.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted. And in order to do this, we must recur to the Governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of independent nations. We must inquire who, at that time, were recognised as the people or citizens of a State whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English Government, and who declared their independence and assumed the powers of Government to defend their rights by force of arms.
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics which no one thought of disputing or supposed to be open to dispute, and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.
And in no nation was this opinion more firmly fixed or more uniformly acted upon than by the English Government and English people. They not only seized them on the coast of Africa and sold them or held them in slavery for their own use, but they took them as ordinary articles of merchandise to every country where they could make a profit on them, and were far more extensively engaged in this commerce than any other nation in the world.
The opinion thus entertained and acted upon in England was naturally impressed upon the colonies they founded on this side of the Atlantic. And, accordingly, a negro of the African race was regarded by them as an article of property, and held, and bought and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen colonies which united in the Declaration of Independence and afterwards formed the Constitution of the United States. The slaves were more or less numerous in the different colonies as slave labor was found more or less profitable. But no one seems to have doubted the correctness of the prevailing opinion of the time.
The legislation of the different colonies furnishes positive and indisputable proof of this fact.
It would be tedious, in this opinion, to enumerate the various laws they passed upon this subject. It will be sufficient, as a sample of the legislation which then generally prevailed throughout the British colonies, to give the laws of two of them, one being still a large slaveholding State and the other the first State in which slavery ceased to exist.
The province of Maryland, in 1717, ch. 13, s. 5, passed a law declaring “that if any free negro or mulatto intermarry with any white woman, or if any white man shall intermarry with any negro or mulatto woman, such negro or mulatto shall become a slave during life, excepting mulattoes born of white women, who, for such intermarriage, shall only become servants for seven years, to be disposed of as the justices of the county court where such marriage so happens shall think fit, to be applied by them towards the support of a public school within the said county. And any white man or white woman who shall intermarry as aforesaid with any negro or mulatto, such white man or white woman shall become servants during the term of seven years, and shall be disposed of by the justices as aforesaid, and be applied to the uses aforesaid.”
The other colonial law to which we refer was passed by Massachusetts in 1705 (chap. 6). It is entitled “An act for the better preventing of a spurious and mixed issue,” &c., and it provides, that “if any negro or mulatto shall presume to smite or strike any person of the English or other Christian nation, such negro or mulatto shall be severely whipped, at the discretion of the justices before whom the offender shall be convicted.”
And “that none of her Majesty’s English or Scottish subjects, nor of any other Christian nation, within this province, shall contract matrimony with
nor shall any person, duly authorized to solemnize marriage, presume to join any such in marriage, on pain of forfeiting the one moiety thereof to her Majesty, for and towards the support of the Government within this province, and the other moiety to him or them that shall inform and sue for the same, in any of her Majesty’s courts of record within the province, by bill, plaint, or information.”
We give both of these laws in the words used by the respective legislative bodies because the language in which they are framed, as well as the provisions contained in them, show, too plainly to be misunderstood the degraded condition of this unhappy race. They were still in force when the Revolution began, and are a faithful index to the state of feeling towards the class of persons of whom they speak, and of the position they occupied throughout the thirteen colonies, in the eyes and thoughts of the men who framed the Declaration of Independence and established the State Constitutions and Governments. They show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery, and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriages between white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the parties, but in the person who joined them in marriage. And no distinction in this respect was made between the free negro or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma of the deepest degradation was fixed upon the whole race.
We refer to these historical facts for the purpose of showing the fixed opinions concerning that race upon which the statesmen of that day spoke and acted. It is necessary to do this in order to determine whether the general terms used in the Constitution of the United States as to the rights of man and the rights of the people was intended to include them, or to give to them or their posterity the benefit of any of its provisions.
The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive:
It begins by declaring that, “[w]hen in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”
It then proceeds to say:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all m that they are endowed by their Creator with certai that among them is [sic] life, liberty, and the
that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”
The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of mankind to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.
Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men — high in literary acquirements, high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting. They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others, and they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.
This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and language.
The brief preamble sets forth by whom it was formed, for what purposes, and for whose benefit and protection. It declares that it is formed by the people of the United States — that is to say, by those who were members of the different political communities in the several States — and its great object is declared to be to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity. It speaks in general terms of the people of the United States, and of citizens of the several States, when it is providing for the exercise of the powers granted or the privileges secured to the citizen. It does not define what description of persons are intended to be included under these terms, or who shall be regarded as a citizen and one of the people. It uses them as terms so well understood that no further description or definition was necessary.
But there are two clauses in the Constitution which point directly and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed.
One of these clauses reserves to each of the thirteen States the right to import slaves until the year 1808 if it thinks proper. And the importation which it thus sanctions was unquestionably of persons of the race of which we are speaking, as the traffic in slaves in the United States had always been confined to them. And by the other provision the States pledge themselves to each other to maintain the right of property of the master by delivering up to him any slave who may have escaped from his service, and be found within their respective territories. By the first above-mentioned clause, therefore, the right to purchase and hold this property is directly sanctioned and authorized for twenty years by the people who framed the Constitution. And by the second, they pledge themselves to maintain and uphold the right of the master in the manner specified, as long as the Government they then formed should endure. And these two provisions show conclusively that neither the description of persons therein referred to nor their descendants were embraced in any of the other provisions of the Constitution, for certainly these two clauses were not intended to confer on them or their posterity the blessings of liberty, or any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen.
No one of that race had ever migrated to the United S all of them had been brought here as articles of merchandise. The number that had been emancipated at that time were but few in comparison with those held in slavery, and they were identified in the public mind with the race to which they belonged, and regarded as a part of the slave population rather than the free. It is obvious that they were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were conferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in every other part of the Union.
Indeed, when we look to the condition of this race in the several States at the time, it is impossible to believe that these rights and privileges were intended to be extended to them. …
The only two provisions which point to them and include them treat them as property and make it the duty of the Gove no other power, in relation to this race, is to be found in the C and as it is a Government of special, delegated, powers, no authority beyond these two provisions can be constitutionally exercised. The Government of the United States had no right to interfere for any other purpose but that of protecting the rights of the owner, leaving it altogether with the several States to deal with this race, whether emancipated or not, as each State may think justice, humanity, and the interests and safety of society, require. The States evidently intended to reserve this power exclusively to themselves.
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by whi but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privi and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day. This court was not created by the Constitution for such purposes. Higher and graver trusts have been confided to it, and it must not falter in the path of duty.
What the construction was at that time we think can hardly admit of doubt. We have the language of the Declaration of Independence and of the Articles of Confederation, in addition to the plain words of the C we have the legislation of the different States, before, about the time, and since the Cons we have the legislation of Congress, from the time of its adoptio and we have the constant and uniform action of the Executive Department, all concurring together, and leading to the same result. And if anything in relation to the construction of the Constitution can be regarded as settled, it is that which we now give to the word “citizen” and the word “people.”
And, upon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the court is of opinion, that, upon the facts stated in the plea in abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts, and consequently that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and that the judgment on the plea in abatement is erroneous. …
We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the facts relied on by the plaintiff entitled him to his freedom.
The case, as he himself states it, on the record brought here by his writ of error, is this:
The plaintiff was a negro slave, belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the United States. In the year 1834, he took the plaintiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the Territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situate north of the latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of the State of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery at said Fort Snelling from said last-mentioned date until the year 1838. …
In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff [and wife Harriet and their daughter Eliza] from said Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.
Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, and Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them, and each of them, as slaves.
In considering this part of the controversy, two questions arise: 1. Was he, together with his family, free in Missouri by reason of the stay in the territory of the United States hereinbefore mentioned? And 2. If they were not, is Scott himself free by reason of his removal to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, as stated in the above admissions?
We proceed to examine the first question.
The act of Congress upon which the plaintiff relies declares that slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall be forever prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by France, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and not included within the limits of Missouri. And the difficulty which meets us at the threshold of this part of the inquiry is whether Congress was authorized to pass this law under any of the powers granted to it by the C for if the authority is not given by that instrument, it is the duty of this court to declare it void and inoperative, and incapable of conferring freedom upon anyone who is held as a slave under the laws of any one of the States.
The counsel for the plaintiff has laid much stress upon that article in the Constitution which confers on Congress the power “to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States,” but, in the judgment of the court, that provision has no bearing on the present controversy, and the power there given, whatever it may be, is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory which at that time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States, and was within their boundaries as settled by the treaty with Great Britain, and can have no influence upon a territory afterwards acquired from a foreign Government. It was a special provision for a known and particular territory, and to meet a present emergency, and nothing more. …
We do not mean, however, to question the power of Congress in this respect. The power to expand the territory of the United States by the admission of new States is plainly given, and, in the construction of this power by all the departments of the Government, it has been held to authorize the acquisition of territory not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation would entitle it to admission. …
But, until that time arrives, it is undoubtedly necessary that some Government should be established in order to organize society and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property, and as the people of the United States could act in this matter only through the Government which represented them and the through which they spoke and acted when the Territory was obtained, it was not only within the scope of its powers, but it was its duty, to pass such laws and establish such a Government as would enable those by whose authority they acted to reap the advantages anticipated from its acquisition and to gather there a population which would enable it to assume the position to which it was destined among the States of the Union. …
But the power of Congress over the person or property of a citizen can never be a mere discretionary power under our Constitution and form of Government. The powers of the Government and the rights and privileges of the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by the Constitution itself. And when the Territory becomes a part of the United States, the Federal Government enters into possession in the character impressed upon it by those who created it. It enters upon it with its powers over the citizen strictly defined, and limited by the Constitution, from which it derives its own existence and by virtue of which alone it continues to exist and act as a Government and sovereignty. It has no power of any kind beyond it, and it cannot, when it enters a Territory of the United States, put off its character and assume discretionary or despotic powers which the Constitution has denied to it. It cannot create for itself a new character separated from the citizens of the United States and the duties it owes them under the provisions of the Constitution. The Territory being a part of the United States, the Government and the citizen both enter it under the authority of the Constitution, with their respective rights defined and marked out, and the Federal Government can exercise no power over his person or property beyond what that instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved. …
The powers over person and property of which we speak are not only not granted to Congress, but are in express terms denied, and they are forbidden to exercise them. And this prohibition is not confined to the States, but the words are general, and extend to the whole territory over which the Constitution gives it power to legislate, including those portions of it remaining under Territorial Government, as well as that covered by States. It is a total absence of power everywhere within the dominion of the United States, and places the citizens of a Territory, so far as these rights are concerned, on the same footing with citizens of the States, and guards them as firmly and plainly against any inroads which the General Government might attempt under the plea of implied or incidental powers. And if Congress itself cannot do this — if it is beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government — it will be admitted, we presume, that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise them. It could confer no power on any local Government established by its authority to violate the provisions of the Constitution.
It seems, however, to be supposed that there is a difference between property in a slave and other property and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States. And the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon the relation of master and slave and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers which Governments may exercise over it have been dwelt upon in the argument.
But, in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the people of the United States and their Government and interfering with their relation to each other. The powers of the Government and the rights of the citizen under it are positive and practical regulations plainly written down. The people of the United States have delegated to it certain enumerated powers and forbidden it to exercise others. It has no power over the person or property of a citizen but what the citizens of the United States have granted. And no laws or usages of other nations, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of master and slave, can enlarge the powers of the Government or take from the citizens the rights they have reserved. And if the Constitution recognises the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the Government.
Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United States in every State that might desire it for twenty years. And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words — too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property or which entitles property of that kind to less protection [than] property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void, and that neither Dred Scott himself nor any of his family were made free by being carried into this territory, even if they had been carried there by the owner with the intention of becoming a permanent resident. …
Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court that it appears by the record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution, and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it. Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a mandate issued directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
by Frederick Douglass | May 1857
by William Lloyd Garrison | March 12,
by Abraham Lincoln | June 26,
by Abraham Lincoln | June 16,
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