求好心人帮忙翻译机械英语 ，在线等急求，，，不要软件翻译的那种，谢谢大家帮帮我_百度知道
求好心人帮忙翻译机械英语 ，在线等急求，，，不要软件翻译的那种，谢谢大家帮帮我
In Fig. 6 the temperatures within the workpiece at various depths
calculated
all grinding wheels for different depths of cut. These temperaturesare taken for the same step of the analysis shown in Figs 4 and 5 and are shown underneath the grinding wheel where the maximum temperatures are reached. In the same diagrams, the three critical
temperatures
for the 100Cr6 steel are also indicated. From
Fig. 6, the theoretical depth of the heat-affected zones can be determined for each
wheel used and depth of cut. In Fig. 6(a)
it can be seen that there is
austenitic transformafion since the temperatures are not high enough. On the other hand, when grinding with wheel 6 and for a depth of cut of 0.05 mm, the austenific transformafion temperature is exceeded in the layers at depths up to 0.1 mm below the surface (see Fig. 6(b)).A
presented in
to predict approximately the temperature on the surface and within the workpiece for grinding
for different values
of equivalent chip thickness, h, designated as The equivalent chip thickness includes the effect of the three grinding parameters and may be more suitable than the depth of cut for use for the optimisation of the grinding parameters. In order to
observe or to
necessary to decrease the depth of cut and it is also possible
to suitably change the grinding conditions. In the same diagram, the regions within the critical temperatures are also indicated
be predicted. Such diagrams can also be constructed for the other wheels, using results obtained from the finite- they may be used as a guide for selecfing the optimal grinding conditions.5.
ConclusionsThe commercial implicit finite element code MARC has been employed to
the grinding
hardened steels
with aluminium oxide grinding wheels and the following conclusions may be drawn:1.
The maximum temperature and the distribufion of the temperature fields in the
workpiece can be calculated successfully
the tangential force per unit width of the workpiece during the process is known.2.
Using the temperature fields derived from the model, the heat-affected
predicted, considering
temperatures
tempering,
martensitic and austenitic transformation.
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图6温度在工件在不同深度的表面下面显示，作为计算所有砂轮不同切削深度。这些温度采取同样的步骤的分析，显示在图4和图5显示在砂轮的最高温度达到。在同一个图表，三临界温度的100cr6钢也表明。从图6，理论深度的热影响区可确定为每个轮和切割深度。在图6（一）可以看出，有没有奥氏体transformafion由于温度不够高。另一方面，当磨轮6和一个切割深度为0.05毫米，这transformafion铸造奥氏体温度超过在层深度可达0.1毫米以下的表面（见图6（二））。图是在图7预测大约在表面和内部温度工件砂轮6不同的价值相当于芯片厚度，小时，指定为当量磨削厚度包括影响三磨削参数和可能更适合比深度削减用于优化磨削参数。以观察或限制其临界值，这是没有必要减少切削深度，它也可以适当改变研磨条件。在相同的图，区域内的临界温度也表示了等高线带使热影响区预测。这种图表也可以建造的其他车轮，使用结果的有限元模型；他们可能被用来指导植物最佳磨矿条件。5。结论商业隐式有限元代码马克被用来模拟磨削淬硬钢氧化铝砂轮，可以得出以下结论：1。最高温度和温度分布的领域在工件可以成功地计算了当电源或切向力每单位宽度的工件的过程中是已知的。2。使用温度域从模型，热影响区的工件可以预测，考虑到临界温度和回火，马氏体和奥氏体转变。
其他类似问题
其他1条回答
在图6的温度在工件表面下不同深度出现时,计算所有不同深处的砂轮切割。这些温度是采取相同的措施的分析显示,在无花果里4和5显示在砂轮在温度达到最大值。在同一个图表,三个关键的温度水中钢100展望。从图6、理论深度可以确定热影响区各轮使用和切削深度。在图6(1)可以看出,没有奥氏体transformafion由于温度不是够高的了。另一方面,当磨砂轮、6和切削深度0.05毫米,austenific transformafion层温度超过0.1毫米在深达地表以下(见图6(b)。一个图表呈现在图7预测大约温度在表面和零件内不同的价值观砂轮六等效晶片厚度、h、指定为等效厚度的影响芯片包含三个磨削参数和一个人更适合切削深度比为优化使用磨参数。为了观察crifical或限制它的价值,这是没有必要降低切削深度,也可以适当改变磨削条件下。在同一图,在关键地区的气温也指出,由轮廓乐队热影响区可以预测的。这样的图表也可以建造另一个轮子,用有限元模型的计算结果,可以做为标定selecfing磨削条件下的最优。5。结论商业隐式有限元程序MARC已经采用模拟磨削硬钢与氧化铝砂轮和以下结论可能被吸引。1。最高温度及温度场的distribufion工件可以计算出该模型成功地用电源后切向力或单位宽度,在这个过程中,工件的是已知的。2。利用温度场来源于模型、热影响区工件可以预测的,考虑到临界温度的回火、和马氏体、奥氏体转变。
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出门在外也不愁求英语免费在线人工翻译 感谢各位高手！在线等
求英语免费在线人工翻译 感谢各位高手！在线等
It’s another day of work as a Capitalist where lessons are learned daily. My Rich Dad always told me, “It’s not how much money you make, it’s how much money you keep. Money withoutfinancial education&is money that will soon be lost. Just look at all the retired athletes and lottery winners…broke!”
My rich dad was right. In these desperate times, I am again learning how important corporations are to the rich and those planning on becoming rich.
Now more than ever, if you have money, people will come after you. I am going through this right now. If you’re planning to get rich, it could save you a lot of time, money and protect you from lawsuits.
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In other words, the market can give rise not to independent watchdogs serving the public interest but to corporate mercenaries which adjust their critical scrutiny to suit their private purpose. Market suppression Still more serious is the way in which the market can silence media watchdogs altogether. Many privately owned media organizations supported right-wing military coups in Latin American countries (Fox 1988; Waisbord 2000b). This military coups in Chile, loyally supported the Pinochet dictatorship and largely overlooked its violation of human rights. Similarly, the Globo television network gave unconditional support to the military regime in Brazil, while most of the Argentina’s privately owned media failed to investigate state- ‘disappearances’ during the period of military rule. Less dramatically, private media in Taiwan ‘not really accepted authoritarian rule’, according to Lee (), ‘but also helped to rationalize it’ during the period before 1987. In each case, these media collaborations with authoritarian states arose because media owners were part of the system of power.
Even in the societies where market-based media have a more independent and adversarial relationship to government, appearances can still be deceptive. Media attacks to official wrongdoing can follow private agendas. ‘Fearless’ feats of investigative journalism, in these circumstances, are not necessarily the disinterested acts undertaken on behalf of the public that they appear to be. For example, a seven-person team from Northwestern University examined six investigative stories exposing official fraud, failure or injustice that appeared in the American media in the period 1981-8 (Protess et al.1991). All the stories, it turned out, were initiated and sourced by well-positioned power holders. In most cases, media tip-offs were part of a conscious agenda-building strategy by ‘policy elites’ who were preparing the ground for a policy change or were engaged in boosting their personal reputations. Media disclosure can be beat understood, according to this debunking account, as an integral part of elite media management in which the public are regularly sidelined.5
Even the Watergate investigation (exposing high-level Republican involvement in the 1972 break-in into the Democrat headquarters and President Nixon’s subsequent cover-up, leading to his forced resignation), cited earlier as an example of heroic media vigilance, is not immune from this demythologizing approach. It has gone down in legend as an example of intrepid journalists doggedly tracking down the truth, and changing the course of history. In fact,
most of the press’s independent investigation took the form of receiving pre-culled information from state officials. Furthermore ‘the moving force’, according to Gladys and Kurt Lang (), ‘behind the effort to get to he bottom of Watergate came neither from the media nor public opinion but from political insiders’ who maintained pressure for the story to be pursued, and to be recognized as important. This elite guidance, the Langs suggest, was mixed blessing. It resulted in Watergate being defined narrowly by the news media as a legal-juridical issue, which limited unduly the reform of the political system that followed after Nixon’s resignation.
Limits of the ‘watchdog’ perspective
The traditional public watchdog definition of the media thus legitimates the case for broadcasting reform and strengthens the defence of a free market press. At first glance, this approach appears to have much to commend it. After all, critical surveillance of the state is clearly an important aspect of the democratic functioning of the media. Exposure of the Watergate scandal during the Nixon presidency or lesser known exploits (outside their country) such as press disclosure of the ‘Narcogate’ scandal in 1991 when senior officials in the Argentine government were revealed to be involved in drug-money laundering operations or Caco Barccllo’s revelations of the cold-blooded murder of black and mestizo suspects in the 1990s by Sao Paulo’s military police (Waisbord
and 41), are all heroic examples of the way in which the media served society by investigating the abuse of authority by public officials.
However this argument is not as clear-cut as it seems. While the watchdog role of the media is enormously important, it is perhaps quixotic to argue that it should be paramount and determine media policy. This conventional view derives from the eighteenth century when the principal ‘media’ were public affairs oriented newspapers. By contrast, media systems in the early twenty-first century are given over largely to entertainment. Even many so-called ‘new media’ allocate only small part of their content to public affairs4 – and a tiny amount to disclosure of official wrongdoing. In effect, the liberal orthodoxy principle of the media in terms of what they do not do most of the time.
The watchdog argument also appears time worn in another way. Traditionally, liberal theory holds that government is the sole object of press vigilance. This derives from a period when government was commonly thought to be the ‘seat’ of power. However, this traditional view fails to take account of the exercise of economic power by shareholders and managers. A revised conception is needed in which the media are conceived as being a check on both public and private authority.
This modification diminishes the case for ‘market freedom’ since it can no longer be equated with independence from all forms of power. A growing section of the world’s media has been taken over by major industrial and commercial concerns such as General Electric, Westinghouse, Toshiba, Fiat, Bouyges and Santo Domingo groups, in a development that extends from the United States and Japan to Hungary and Columbia ( Bagdikian 1997; Herman and McChesney 1997; Osrergard 1997; Tunstall and Machin 1999; Curran and Park 2000). A number of media organizations has also grown into huge leisure conglomerates that are among the largest corporations in the world. The issue is no longer simply that the media are compromised by their links to big business: the media are big business.
The conglomeration of news media mostly took place during the last three decades. It gave rise sometimes to no-go areas where journalists were reluctant to treat for fear of stepping on the corporate toes of a parent or sister company (Hollingsworth 1986; Bagdikian 1997; Curran and Seaton 1997). It is also claimed plausibly that the media are in genera less vigilant in relation to corporate than public bureaucracy abuse because they are part of the corporate business sector (McChesney 1997).
Market corruption
The classic liberal response to these criticisms is that the main target of media scrutiny because the state has monopoly of legitimated violence, and is therefore the institution to be feared most. For this reason, it is especially important to establish a critical distance between the media and the governmental system through private media ownership.
This seemingly persuasive argument ignores the way in which the world has changed since the early eighteenth century when ‘Cato’ (]) set out with such powerful eloquence the press watchdog thesis. Media organizations have become more profit oriented. The sphere of government has been greatly enlarged, with the result that political decisions more often affect their profit ability. Yet, governments need the media more than ever, because they now have to retain mass electoral support to stay in office.
These cumulative changes have given rise to a relationship that is increasingly prone to corruption. This is highlighted by Chadwick’s (1989) pioneering research which shows that a number of media entrepreneurs found a tactical alliance with the Labour government in Australia in the late 1980s as a way of securing official permission to consolidate their control over Australia’s commercial television and press. This resulted in an unprecedented number of editorial endorsements for the Labour Party in the 1987 election, as well as opportunities fence-sitting by some traditionally anti-Labour papers. Similarly Rupert Murdoch removed the critically independent BBC World News service from his Asian Star satellite system in 1994, and vetoed HarperCollins’s publication of ex-Hong Kong governor Chris Patten’s memories in 1998, because he wanted to curry favour with the Chinese government in order to obtain permission to expand his operations in China. In much the same way the Argentine media tycoon, Eduardo Eurnekian, axed a critical television report on the building of an expensive airstrip on President Menem’s private property. At the time, Eurnekian was bidding for and duly obtained a major steak in Argentina’s privatized airports (Waisbord 2000b).
Indeed, the potential for media corruption was enormously increased by the deregulatory policies that were pursued in the 1980s and 1990s. Lucrative broadcasting and telecommunications franchis new arrangements were made for their operation which affected their cos and the rules governing media acquisitions and cross-media ownership were changed. Whether leading media corporations became much bigger, more dominant and more profitable depended, in part, on political and bureaucratic decisions. This encouraged a number of non-aggression pacts typified by the tacit understanding that was reached between Tony Blair, as leader of the Labour opposition in Britain, and Rupert Murdoch in the mid-1990s. Tabloid hounds pursuing Labour were called to heel in return for very strong signals that a New Labour government would not attack Murdoch’s monopolist empire (Curran and Leys 2000).
In other words, the market can give rise not to independent watchdogs serving the public interest but to corporate mercenaries which adjust their critical scrutiny to suit their private purpose.
Market suppression Still more serious is the way in which the market can silence media watchdogs altogether. Many privately owned media organizations supported right-wing military coups in Latin American countries (Fox 1988; Waisbord 2000b). This military coups in Chile, loyally supported the Pinochet dictatorship and largely overlooked its violation of human rights. Similarly, the Globo television network gave unconditional support to the military regime in Brazil, while most of the Argentina’s privately owned media failed to investigate state- ‘disappearances’ during the period of military rule. Less dramatically, private media in Taiwan ‘not really accepted authoritarian rule’, according to Lee (), ‘but also helped to rationalize it’ during the period before 1987. In each case, these media collaborations with authoritarian states arose because media owners were part of the system of power.
Even in the societies where market-based media have a more independent and adversarial relationship to government, appearances can still be deceptive. Media attacks to official wrongdoing can follow private agendas. ‘Fearless’ feats of investigative journalism, in these circumstances, are not necessarily the disinterested acts undertaken on behalf of the public that they appear to be. For example, a seven-person team from Northwestern University examined six investigative stories exposing official fraud, failure or injustice that appeared in the American media in the period 1981-8 (Protess et al.1991). All the stories, it turned out, were initiated and sourced by well-positioned power holders. In most cases, media tip-offs were part of a conscious agenda-building strategy by ‘policy elites’ who were preparing the ground for a policy change or were engaged in boosting their personal reputations. Media disclosure can be beat understood, according to this debunking account, as an integral part of elite media management in which the public are regularly sidelined.5
Even the Watergate investigation (exposing high-level Republican involvement in the 1972 break-in into the Democrat headquarters and President Nixon’s subsequent cover-up, leading to his forced resignation), cited earlier as an example of heroic media vigilance, is not immune from this demythologizing approach. It has gone down in legend as an example of intrepid journalists doggedly tracking down the truth, and changing the course of history. In fact,
most of the press’s independent investigation took the form of receiving pre-culled information from state officials. Furthermore ‘the moving force’, according to Gladys and Kurt Lang (), ‘behind the effort to get to he bottom of Watergate came neither from the media nor public opinion but from political insiders’ who maintained pressure for the story to be pursued, and to be recognized as important. This elite guidance, the Langs suggest, was mixed blessing. It resulted in Watergate being defined narrowly by the news media as a legal-juridical issue, which limited unduly the reform of the political system that followed after Nixon’s resignation.
What all these examples point to is the inadequacy of the liberal model which explains the media solely in terms of market theory. The media are assumed to be independent, and to owe allegiance only to the public, if they are funded by the public and private interests of media shareholders, the influence exerted through news management and the ideological power of leading groups in society. In short, this extremely simplistic theory fails to take into account the wider relations of power in which the media are situated. This is a key point to which we shall return when we consider other aspects of the media’s democratic role.
State control If private media are subject to compromising constraint, so too of course are public media. There is no lack of examples where public broadcasters have acted as little more than mouthpieces of government (Downing 1996; Sparks 1998; Curran and Park 2000; Waisbord 2000a). These cautionary experiences reveal the variety of levers that governments can pull to get the broadcasting they want. Public broadcasters have been subject to direct censorship through restrictive
licences to broadcast have been allocated to g broadcasters have been encouraged to censor themselves in response to a variety of pressures (public criticism, private intimacy, information management, refusals to increase public funding, the threat of privatization or the loss of a
and journalists who cannot be intimidated have been summarily sacked, jailed or even killed.
However, a qualifying note needs to be introduced at this point. The radical media literature is bedevilled
by a simplifying ‘system logic’ which assumes that state-controlled media serve the state and business-controlled media serve business. This ignores or downplays countervailing influences. Privately owned media need to maintain audience interest in or they have to sustain public legitimacy in order to avoid societal retribution, and they can be influenced by the professional concerns of their staff. All these factors potentially work against the subordination of private media to the political commitments and economic interests of their shareholders. Likewise, the long-term interest of public broadcasters is best served by developing a reputation for independence that wins public trust, and sustains political support beyond the duration of the current administration. In many liberal democracies, the ideal of broadcasting independence is not only pursued by broadcasting staff for professional reasons, but is supported also by the political elite partly out of self-interest. Senior politicians of all major parties know they, they will need access to broadcasting when they are voted out of office.
The autonomy of publicly regulated broadcasting is also supported by a system of checks and balances. While this varies from country to country, it usually includes in Western Europe a number of the following features: the constitutional guarantee of f formal rules requiring broadcasting impartial civic society or all-party representation on broa funding by licence fee rather than dir competition between broadc diversity of broadcasting orga and the devolution of authority within them (Ostergaard 1997; Humphreys 1996; Raboy 1996). The ultimate safeguard of broadcasting independence is that it has generally the support of the public.
翻译的材料是5、6、7、8楼，第一次发帖，不知道前面的怎么没了，谢谢各位~！
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